Category: Rajasthan High Court Jaipur

Husband Not Liable for Wife’s Dues : Rajasthan High Court on Panchayat Election No-Dues Certificate

Husband Not Liable for Wife’s Dues Rajasthan High Court on Panchayat Election No-Dues Certificate Jaipur, September 2, 2026: The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, has held that a husband cannot be compelled to pay an amount recoverable from his wife merely because she is the erstwhile Sarpanch against whom recovery proceedings have been initiated. The Court further held that the authorities cannot deny a No-Dues/No-Objection Certificate to the husband for contesting a forthcoming Panchayati Raj election solely on the ground that an amount is recoverable from his wife. The judgment was delivered by Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11020/2026, Ramlaxman Meena v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., decided on September 2, 2026. The order is marked “Reportable.” Key Takeaway A person’s eligibility to contest a Panchayati Raj election cannot be made dependent upon recovery of dues from a spouse when the person himself is neither a surety nor a guarantor and there is no statutory provision making him liable for those dues. The High Court ultimately directed the authorities to issue the petitioner a No-Dues/No-Objection Certificate forthwith for the purpose of contesting the upcoming Panchayati Raj elections. What Was the Dispute Before the Rajasthan High Court? The petitioner, Ramlaxman Meena, approached the Rajasthan High Court seeking directions to the authorities to issue him a no-dues certificate so that he could contest the upcoming Panchayati Raj election for Gram Panchayat Falenda. The dispute arose because the petitioner’s wife, Laxmi Bai, had earlier served as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Falenda during the 1995–2000 tenure. An enquiry had been conducted against her, following which a recovery order was issued. When the amount was not deposited, proceedings for attachment/auction of her property were initiated. She challenged those proceedings before the High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11544/2009. An interim order dated September 16, 2009 restrained the authorities from auctioning her property, and that petition remained pending for adjudication. The petitioner subsequently sought to contest the forthcoming Panchayati Raj election. However, the authorities refused to issue him the required certificate because of the amount allegedly recoverable from his wife. Can a Husband Be Made Liable for His Wife’s Government Dues? No, not merely because he is her husband. This was the central legal issue considered by the High Court. The State argued that since the petitioner was the husband of the erstwhile Sarpanch, he was duty-bound to deposit the amount due from his wife. According to the State, until the amount was deposited by either the petitioner or his wife, a no-dues certificate could not be issued and the petitioner could not be permitted to contest the election. The High Court rejected this position. The Court specifically observed that while a surety or guarantor may be liable for the dues of another person, the petitioner in the present case was neither a surety nor a guarantor of his wife in respect of the recovery amount. Therefore, the recovery dispute remained a separate matter between the State and the erstwhile Sarpanch. Husband and Wife Are Separate Legal Entities One of the most significant observations in the judgment concerns the independent legal status of spouses. The Court held that a public representative is personally responsible for his or her own misconduct or disgraceful act. If recovery proceedings arise against that person, that person is responsible for clearing the dues. The Court questioned the basis on which recovery proceedings could be initiated against family members of an erstwhile Sarpanch merely because the Sarpanch had outstanding dues. The judgment expressly states that husband and wife are separate entities and that one spouse cannot ordinarily be held liable for the misconduct or liability of the other merely because of the marital relationship. Importantly, the Court also identified an exception: the husband could potentially be proceeded against if an enquiry established that he had himself been involved in the Panchayat works or had participated in the alleged misconduct. Thus, the judgment does not mean that a spouse can never have liability connected with the other’s conduct. Rather, liability cannot be imposed simply because of the marital relationship when there is no independent legal basis for doing so. What Did the Court Say About the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994? The petitioner had argued that failure of his wife to deposit the disputed amount could not disqualify him from contesting the election under Section 19(m) of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The High Court’s reasoning focused on the absence of any provision authorising recovery of the wife’s dues from her family members. The Court observed that neither the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, nor the Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996, contained a provision authorising recovery of such an amount from family members of the Sarpanch merely because the Sarpanch had failed to pay the amount. This absence of statutory authority was central to the Court’s decision. Can Authorities Deny a No-Dues Certificate Because of a Spouse’s Dues? In the circumstances of this case, the Rajasthan High Court said no. The Court considered whether the authorities could: force the petitioner to deposit the amount allegedly due from his wife; or deny the petitioner a no-dues/no-objection certificate required for contesting the Panchayati Raj election. The Court found that the authorities could not make the petitioner pay his wife’s dues when he had not undertaken liability as a surety or guarantor and there was no statutory provision making him responsible for those dues. The Court described the action of requiring the petitioner to pay the amount owed by his wife in order to obtain the certificate as an example of “non-application of mind” and held that such action was unwarranted. Rajasthan High Court’s Final Order The High Court allowed the writ petition. The respondents were directed to issue the petitioner a No-Dues/No-Objection Certificate forthwith for the purpose of contesting the forthcoming Panchayati Raj elections. The Court also disposed of the stay application and all pending applications, if any. Frequently Asked Questions 1. Can a husband be forced to pay his

Government Can Transfer Employees, But Transfer Orders Must Be Fair, Lawful and Free From Arbitrariness – Jaipur High Court

Government Can Transfer Employees, But Transfer Orders Must Be Fair, Lawful and Free From Arbitrariness – Jaipur High Court The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in a significant judgment pronounced on 17 August 2026, has laid down a structured mechanism for dealing with grievances arising from government and institutional transfer orders. The judgment was delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sameer Jain in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14009/2026, Dr. Mahesh Meena v. State of Rajasthan, which was treated as the lead matter for a large batch of connected writ petitions. The Court clarified that its decision would apply to the connected petitions on a mutatis mutandis basis. The judgment is important because the Court has attempted to strike a balance between the State’s administrative power to transfer employees and the requirement that such power be exercised lawfully, fairly, transparently and without arbitrariness. Importantly, the Court did not hold that government employees have a right to remain posted at a particular station. Instead, it created a time-bound mechanism through which individual transfer grievances are to be reconsidered by the competent authorities. What did the Rajasthan High Court decide on transfer orders? The Rajasthan High Court held that transfer is ordinarily an incident of service and an employee has no vested right to remain posted at a particular place. However, the State’s power to transfer is not absolute and remains subject to statutory provisions, applicable policies, constitutional principles of fairness and judicial review where the decision is affected by illegality, mala fides, arbitrariness or other recognised grounds. This distinction is the central principle running through the judgment: The existence of the power to transfer and the legality of exercising that power are two different questions. The Court accepted the settled principle that courts ordinarily should not substitute their own view for that of the competent administrative authority regarding where an employee should be posted. At the same time, judicial review remains available where the transfer is shown to involve circumstances such as: violation of a mandatory statutory provision; lack of jurisdiction or an incompetent authority; mala fide exercise of power; extraneous considerations; colourable exercise of power; patent arbitrariness; non-application of mind; or disregard of relevant and compelling circumstances. Why did the transfer dispute reach the Rajasthan High Court? The batch involved transfer orders affecting employees across various government departments, Boards, Corporations, Discoms, local authorities and other establishments. The petitioners raised several common grievances. These included allegations of blanket, premature and repeated transfers, failure to consider individual circumstances, violation of departmental transfer guidelines, lack of sanctioned posts at transferred locations, political or extraneous interference, and transfers allegedly being used for punitive or other impermissible purposes. The Court also noted that transfer litigation had become a recurring feature of its service-law docket. A significant institutional problem identified by the Court was the functioning of the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal (RCSAT). According to material placed before the Court, vacancies and non-availability or non-sitting of requisite Members had contributed to delays in adjudication. The statistics reproduced in the judgment are particularly striking. According to the RCSAT data recorded by the Court, the Tribunal disposed of 4,094 out of 5,290 appeals in 2025, a disposal rate of 77.39%. For 2026, the figures recorded were 1,027 disposed out of 3,467 appeals, leaving 2,440 pending, with a disposal rate of 29.62%. The Court therefore treated the issue as extending beyond individual transfer disputes and into the larger question of administrative and institutional reform. Does a government employee have a right to stay at a particular posting? No. The judgment expressly reiterates that a government employee holding a transferable post does not have an indefeasible or vested right to remain posted at a particular station. The State must retain reasonable latitude to deploy its human resources to ensure administrative efficiency, continuity of public service and implementation of governmental policies. The Court relied upon established Supreme Court jurisprudence, including Shilpi Bose, S.L. Abbas, Rajendra Singh, Gobardhan Lal and other decisions dealing with judicial interference in transfer matters. However, this does not mean that the administration possesses an unrestricted power of transfer. The Court specifically observed that administrative power, however wide, remains subject to law and constitutional governance. Can an employee challenge a transfer order on medical, spouse or family grounds? Such circumstances can certainly be placed before the competent authority, but they do not automatically create a legal right to a particular posting. The Court specifically considered: spouse-related circumstances; serious medical conditions; disability; proximity to retirement; family hardship; dependent family members; previous service in difficult or remote areas; and other compelling personal circumstances. The Court held that these circumstances may justify sympathetic and reasoned administrative consideration, but, in the absence of a statutory mandate or binding provision, they do not themselves create an absolute legal right to remain at a particular station. This is an important distinction: A personal hardship may be a ground for representation without necessarily being a ground for judicially quashing a transfer. What if a transfer violates a statutory rule? That is different. The Court made a clear distinction between violation of a non-statutory administrative guideline and violation of a mandatory statutory provision. A mere departure from an executive instruction or administrative guideline does not automatically give an employee an enforceable right to have a transfer order quashed. But where the alleged violation concerns a statutory rule or mandatory condition governing the exercise of the transfer power, the issue becomes amenable to judicial review. The judgment specifically referred to Rule 20 of the Rajasthan Service Rules and Section 89(8)(ii) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 as examples of statutory provisions whose violation may have legal consequences. What did the High Court say about “administrative exigency”? The State argued that administrative exigency could arise from several circumstances, including: administrative restructuring; manpower rationalisation; vacancy position; functional requirements; public interest; efficiency of administration; reorganisation of work; and other circumstances that may not always be capable of being fully disclosed in an individual transfer order. The Court accepted

Bank Account Frozen Due to Cyber Crime? Jaipur Rajasthan High Court Says Only Disputed Amount Can Be Frozen, Entire Account Cannot Be Blocked

Bank Account Frozen Due to Cyber Crime? Jaipur Rajasthan High Court Says Only Disputed Amount Can Be Frozen, Entire Account Cannot Be Blocked Jaipur Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench | Judgment dated 20 August 2026 | Hon’ble Justice Anand Sharma A bank account can be frozen in connection with a cyber fraud investigation, but an alleged cyber-fraud transaction does not automatically justify freezing the entire bank account indefinitely. In a significant and reportable judgment dated 20 August 2026, the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, dealt with a large batch of writ petitions concerning bank account freezing, debit freezes, lien marking and holds imposed in cyber financial crime investigations. The Court recognised the need to protect cyber-fraud victims and preserve suspected proceeds of crime, but at the same time held that innocent account holders cannot be subjected to arbitrary, indefinite or disproportionate financial restrictions. The principal matter in the judgment is S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2679/2026, Shree Balaji Enterprises v. Reserve Bank of India & Ors., along with connected writ petitions. The judgment was pronounced by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anand Sharma on 20 August 2026. What did the Rajasthan High Court decide about frozen bank accounts? The Rajasthan High Court has laid down important safeguards governing the freezing, debit-freezing, lien marking, holding and seizure of bank accounts in cyber financial crime investigations in the State of Rajasthan. The central principle is one of proportionality: If the disputed cyber-fraud amount is identifiable, the ordinary course should be to place a lien or hold on that disputed amount, rather than freeze the entire bank account. The Court expressly directed that an identifiable disputed amount should ordinarily be protected without unnecessarily preventing the account holder from operating the remaining legitimate balance.This is particularly important where, for example, an account contains several lakh rupees but the alleged disputed transaction is only a few hundred or a few thousand rupees. Why is this judgment important? Cyber fraud investigations frequently involve multiple bank accounts and rapid movement of funds. A genuine cyber-fraud investigation may therefore require immediate action to prevent the suspected proceeds from being withdrawn or transferred. However, the Court recognised that a complete bank-account freeze can have serious consequences. A bank account is not merely a place where money is stored. It is often essential for: receiving salary; receiving business payments; paying employees; paying suppliers and creditors; paying taxes and statutory dues; meeting household expenses; paying rent and utilities; and conducting day-to-day business. The Court therefore observed that a complete freeze can have immediate and serious civil and financial consequences and must satisfy the requirements of legality, rationality, reasonableness, non-arbitrariness and proportionality. Can the police freeze an entire bank account because of a cyber crime complaint? Not automatically. The Rajasthan High Court has clarified that the mere existence of a suspected cyber-fraud transaction does not, by itself, justify an indefinite blanket debit freeze. Before imposing or continuing a restraint, the Investigating Officer must have material demonstrating a prima facie nexus between the particular account or transaction and the offence under investigation. The Court further held that expressions such as: “suspicious transaction”; “mule account”; “Layer-1 account”; or “cyber fraud transaction” cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient reasons for indefinitely immobilising an entire bank account. Such terminology may justify investigation, but it cannot replace the underlying material supporting the suspicion. Therefore, the important question is not merely whether an account has received a suspicious transaction. The authorities must consider: Is there lawful authority for the restraint? Is there objective material connecting the account or transaction with the alleged offence? What particular transaction and amount needs to be protected? Is freezing the entire account actually necessary and proportionate? These four requirements were specifically identified by the Court. What happens if only a small amount is disputed? This is one of the most significant aspects of the judgment. The Court gave an illustrative example where an alleged cyber-fraud amount is ₹500 while the bank account contains ₹5 lakh. According to the Court, the investigative objective would ordinarily be achieved by preserving the disputed ₹500 rather than depriving the account holder of access to the remaining ₹4,99,500. Accordingly, where the disputed amount is identifiable, the normal approach should be: Disputed amount → lien/hold rather than: Disputed amount → complete debit freeze of the entire account. This distinction is fundamental because a lien or hold over the disputed amount preserves the subject matter of the investigation while allowing the account holder to use legitimate funds. When can the entire bank account still be frozen? The judgment does not say that a complete bank-account freeze is never permissible. A wider restraint may be justified in exceptional circumstances. The Court identified examples including situations where: the account appears to be a deliberately operated mule account; there are repeated suspicious credits and onward transfers; the account holder is a named accused; there is material showing conscious participation; the entire balance is reasonably suspected to be proceeds of crime; multiple linked transactions make segregation impracticable; or allowing the account to operate would demonstrably defeat the investigation. Even in such cases, the reasons for adopting the more restrictive measure should be recorded in writing and the restraint should be periodically reviewed. Thus, the judgment does not create an absolute right to operate every bank account during an investigation. Instead, it requires the restriction to be legally justified, evidence-based and proportionate. What information should a police freezing communication contain? The Rajasthan High Court has also addressed another major problem: account holders often do not know why their bank account has been frozen. The Court directed that, subject to legitimate investigative confidentiality, communications issued by police or investigating agencies to banks should contain sufficient particulars to identify the account, transaction and nature of the restraint. As far as legally permissible, such communication should specify: Name and designation of the Investigating Officer; Police station or investigating agency and contact particulars; FIR/crime/NCRP/CFCFRMS reference number, wherever available; Legal provision under which the action is taken; Account number and bank details;

Rajasthan High Court: No Concept of Criminal Writ Petition Under the Constitution

Rajasthan High Court: No Concept of Criminal Writ Petition Under the Constitution In a significant procedural ruling, the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, has clarified that there is no separate concept of a “Criminal Writ Petition” under the Constitution of India. The Court directed the Registry not to register any case under the category of “Criminal Writ Petition” in the future. The Division Bench observed that although a writ petition may raise issues connected with a criminal matter, its criminal subject matter does not convert it into a separate constitutional category called a “Criminal Writ Petition.” Such proceedings are to be registered simply as writ petitions, while the Court may examine their nature for placement before the appropriate roster or Bench. The ruling in Jiya and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others provides important guidance regarding the classification, registration and listing of writ petitions involving criminal law issues before the Rajasthan High Court. Case: Jiya and Others v. State of Rajasthan and OthersCourt: Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur BenchCase No.: D.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 128/2018Date of Order: 07 July 2026Coram: Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice Mr. Sanjeev Prakash Sharma and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Maneesh Sharma Background of the Case The petition was instituted before the Rajasthan High Court as D.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 128/2018. The Registry had also entertained and registered the matter as a criminal writ petition. While considering the matter, the Division Bench examined whether the Constitution recognises “Criminal Writ Petition” as an independent category of legal proceeding. The Court noted that the petition had earlier been adjourned sine die without any plausible reason. While dealing with its procedural status, the Court addressed the broader issue concerning the registration of cases as criminal writ petitions. No Concept of “Criminal Writ Petition” Under the Constitution The principal observation made by the Rajasthan High Court was that the Constitution does not provide for a separate category known as a “Criminal Writ Petition.” The Court observed: “A writ petition can be filed for raising the issues which may also relate to a criminal matter but the same would not be treated as a ‘Criminal Writ Petition’ and the same can only be registered as a writ petition alone.” This clarification distinguishes the nature of the issue raised in a writ petition from the constitutional character of the proceeding. A writ petition may involve issues such as: Police inaction; Illegal detention; Protection of life and personal liberty; Unlawful exercise of police powers; Failure to register an FIR; Improper criminal investigation; Violation of fundamental rights during criminal proceedings; or Illegal or arbitrary action by law-enforcement authorities. However, merely because the subject matter relates to criminal law does not create a separate constitutional proceeding called a “Criminal Writ Petition.” Registry Directed Not to Register Criminal Writ Petitions The Rajasthan High Court issued a clear direction that, henceforth, the Registry shall not register any case as a “Criminal Writ Petition.” The Court clarified that it is for the Court to examine the nature of a case and determine its placement before the appropriate roster. The Registry’s role is to register the proceeding as a writ petition rather than create a separate classification based solely on whether the dispute involves a criminal issue. This direction is likely to bring greater procedural consistency in the registration and classification of writ petitions before the Rajasthan High Court. Existing Criminal Writ Petition Converted into Civil Writ Petition In the present matter, the Court directed the Registry to treat the existing D.B. Criminal Writ Petition as a D.B. Civil Writ Petition. The Court further stated that, for statistical purposes, the D.B. Criminal Writ Petition would stand disposed of. However, the office was directed to check the matter and proceed further. Therefore, the order appears to deal primarily with the procedural classification of the petition rather than deciding the substantive rights or claims raised by the petitioners. Does the Judgment Bar Writ Petitions in Criminal Matters? No. The judgment does not prohibit a person from approaching the High Court through a writ petition merely because the dispute relates to a criminal matter. The Court expressly recognised that a writ petition may raise issues connected with criminal law. The ruling concerns the nomenclature and registration category of such petitions. Accordingly, where a person alleges a violation of fundamental or legal rights arising from police action, investigation, detention or another criminal-law-related issue, an appropriate writ petition may still be maintainable, subject to the facts of the case and applicable legal principles. The effect of the ruling is that such a petition should not be separately classified or registered as a “Criminal Writ Petition.” Difference Between a Criminal Writ Petition and a Writ Petition Involving Criminal Issues Following this judgment, the distinction may be understood as follows: Particular Position Clarified by the Rajasthan High Court Criminal Writ Petition as a separate category Not contemplated under the Constitution Writ petition involving a criminal issue May be filed in an appropriate case Registration by the High Court Registry To be registered as a writ petition Nature of dispute May still involve criminal law or police action Placement before the appropriate Bench To be examined according to the Court’s roster Existing petition in the present case Directed to be treated as a D.B. Civil Writ Petition Practical Impact of the Rajasthan High Court Judgment The judgment may have important procedural implications for advocates, litigants and the Rajasthan High Court Registry. First, petitions involving criminal issues may continue to invoke the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court where legally maintainable. However, such petitions should not be treated as belonging to a separate constitutional category merely because the underlying dispute relates to criminal law. Second, the Registry has been expressly directed not to register future matters as criminal writ petitions. Third, the Court retains the authority to examine the nature of the dispute and determine the appropriate roster or Bench before which the matter should be placed. Fourth, advocates filing writ petitions concerning police action, personal

Rajasthan High Court Examines JDA’s Withdrawal of OTS Flyover EPC Contract and Re-Tendering of DPR Work

Rajasthan High Court Examines JDA’s Withdrawal of OTS Flyover EPC Contract and Re-Tendering of DPR Work The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in a batch of writ petitions led by JCL Infra Private Limited v. Jaipur Development Authority, examined the legality of Jaipur Development Authority’s actions relating to the OTS Flyover project at JLN Marg, Jaipur. The dispute concerns the withdrawal of an Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract previously awarded to JCL Infra and the subsequent issuance of a fresh tender for preparation of a Detailed Project Report (DPR) for the same project. Background of the Dispute The OTS Crossing project was conceived as a traffic improvement and beautification initiative aimed at easing congestion at one of Jaipur’s busiest intersections. The project included construction of a flyover and associated infrastructure works. According to the petitioner, JDA had earlier engaged consultants for preparation of the DPR, which subsequently formed the basis for the EPC tender. Pursuant to the tender process, JCL Infra was awarded the EPC contract through a Letter of Acceptance dated 14 December 2022, followed by execution of a formal contract agreement on 27 December 2022. The contract related to traffic improvement and beautification works at OTS Crossing, JLN Marg, Jaipur, and was valued at approximately ₹184.30 crore. Petitioner’s Case JCL Infra contended that after execution of the contract, it mobilized manpower, machinery, and financial resources and commenced work in accordance with contractual requirements. The company asserted that: Multiple drawings, designs, survey reports and engineering documents were submitted to JDA during 2023. Necessary approvals and site clearances were repeatedly sought from the authority. Despite continuous correspondence, approvals required for execution of the project were allegedly not granted. Work worth approximately ₹20.41 crore had already been executed. Investments of nearly ₹40 crore had been made in the project. The petitioner further argued that repeated representations seeking approvals and release of payments did not receive appropriate responses from JDA. Extension of Time and Subsequent Withdrawal A significant aspect of the dispute relates to the extension of the project period. The petitioner pointed out that JDA extended the project completion timeline up to 30 April 2024. According to JCL Infra, this extension reflected acknowledgment of the subsisting contract and ongoing execution of work. However, shortly thereafter, JDA withdrew the awarded work through a communication dated 24 April 2024 by invoking Clause 32 of the contract. The petitioner challenged this withdrawal, alleging that: The action was arbitrary and illegal. No opportunity of hearing was provided. No adequate reasons were supplied. Clause 32 did not permit withdrawal of the entire contract in the manner adopted by JDA. Fresh DPR Tender and Challenge Before the Court During the pendency of the earlier writ proceedings challenging the withdrawal, JDA issued a fresh Notice Inviting Bid dated 3 April 2025 for consultancy services relating to preparation of a DPR for the proposed elevated road and OTS Flyover project. JCL Infra argued that re-tendering DPR consultancy work for the OTS Flyover was unjustified because: A DPR had already been prepared earlier. The EPC contract had already been awarded on the basis of that DPR. Significant work and investment had already been undertaken. The petitioner characterized the fresh tender as an attempt to restart the project despite the existence of an earlier DPR and a concluded EPC contract. Legal Grounds Raised by the Petitioner The petitioner relied upon several legal principles, including: 1. Violation of Natural Justice JCL Infra contended that withdrawal of the contract was undertaken without affording an opportunity of hearing, contrary to the principles of natural justice. 2. Arbitrary Exercise of Power It was argued that the withdrawal notice lacked sufficient reasons and was therefore arbitrary and unsustainable. 3. Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation The petitioner claimed that it had acted upon JDA’s representations and contractual commitments by mobilizing resources and investing substantial amounts. Consequently, withdrawal of the project allegedly caused severe prejudice. 4. State Obligation to Act Fairly The petitioner emphasized that JDA, being a public authority, was obligated to act fairly, transparently and reasonably even in contractual matters. Respondents’ Stand JDA opposed the petitions and raised objections regarding maintainability as well as merits. The respondents contended that: The petitions were not instituted by a duly authorized person on behalf of the company. Material facts had allegedly been suppressed. The dispute arose from contractual obligations involving disputed questions of fact. Such issues should be adjudicated through appropriate civil or commercial proceedings rather than writ jurisdiction. On merits, JDA maintained that the withdrawal of work was within the powers available under Clause 32 of the contract and that the Engineer-in-Charge possessed authority to take such action. The respondents also asserted that multiple communications and meetings had been conducted regarding delays and deficiencies in execution. Key Issues Before the High Court The proceedings raised several important legal questions: Whether JDA was justified in withdrawing the EPC contract awarded to JCL Infra. Whether the withdrawal complied with contractual provisions and principles of natural justice. Whether re-inviting bids for preparation of a DPR concerning the OTS Flyover was legally sustainable. Whether the dispute could be examined under Article 226 of the Constitution despite arising from a contractual relationship. Whether the petitioner had established arbitrariness in the actions of the public authority. Conclusion The litigation concerning the OTS Flyover project highlights the intersection of public procurement, infrastructure development, contractual obligations and administrative fairness. The dispute revolves around JCL Infra’s allegation that substantial work, investment and contractual commitments were disregarded through withdrawal of the EPC contract and subsequent re-tendering of DPR consultancy services, while JDA maintains that its actions were contractually justified and undertaken in public interest. The Rajasthan High Court examined these competing claims while considering questions of contractual interpretation, natural justice, public law principles and judicial review of governmental decisions in infrastructure projects.

Jaipur High Court on Power of High Court Under Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS to Summon Material Witness

Jaipur High Court on Power of High Court Under Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS to Summon Material Witness In an important ruling concerning the power of High Court under Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS, the Jaipur High Court reaffirmed that criminal courts possess wide authority to summon any material witness, recall witnesses already examined, or examine any person present before the court whenever such evidence is necessary for a just decision. The judgment was delivered in Shankar & Anr. Vs State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 6180/2021, decided on 18/04/2026 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand. Case Title, Number and Date of Judgment Case Title: Shankar & Another Vs State of RajasthanCase Number: S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 6180/2021Court: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at JaipurDate of Judgment: 18 April 2026 Facts Considered by Jaipur High Court The accused persons were facing trial for offences under Sections 376, 363 and 366 IPC along with provisions of the POCSO Act. During trial, statements of the prosecutrix and her mother had already been recorded. Later, a changed circumstance arose when the prosecutrix married one of the accused, namely Shankar, and from the marriage a daughter was born. Thereafter, the accused moved an application seeking recall of the prosecutrix and her mother for fresh examination in view of subsequent events. The trial court rejected the application on 06.09.2021, which was challenged before the Jaipur High Court. Power to Summon Material Witness or Examine Person Present The Jaipur High Court held that the object of Section 311 CrPC is to enable the court to discover truth and render a just decision after bringing all relevant facts on record. The Court observed that this power must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. It further clarified that the provision cannot be used merely to fill lacunae in prosecution or defence, but can certainly be invoked where fresh evidence is necessary in the interest of justice. Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS: Court may summon, recall, or re-examine witnesses in the interest of justicetext{Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS: Court may summon, recall, or re-examine witnesses in the interest of justice}Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS: Court may summon, recall, or re-examine witnesses in the interest of justice The High Court specifically noted that since the trial was still pending, recalling the prosecutrix and her mother would not prejudice the prosecution. Rather, their further statements could assist the court in properly adjudicating the matter after considering changed circumstances. Jaipur High Court Set Aside Trial Court Order Allowing the petition, the Jaipur High Court quashed the order dated 06.09.2021 and directed the trial court to summon PW-1 and PW-2 again, record their evidence, and thereafter decide the case strictly in accordance with law. This judgment is a significant precedent on the power to summon material witness, or examine person present, showing that courts can revisit evidence where justice so requires. Legal Significance Under BNSS After replacement of CrPC by BNSS, the corresponding provision is Section 348 BNSS. Therefore, the principle laid down by the Jaipur High Court remains highly relevant even today. Courts continue to retain authority to summon any witness, recall witnesses already examined, and secure the best available evidence for a fair trial.   Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur

Jaipur High Court Sets Aside RTI Second Appeal Order: Major Relief in RTI Matter Against Rajasthan State Information Commission, Jaipur

Jaipur High Court Sets Aside RTI Second Appeal Order: Major Relief in RTI Matter Against Rajasthan State Information Commission, Jaipur In an important judgment for transparency and citizens’ rights, the Jaipur High Court has quashed an order passed by the Rajasthan State Information Commission, Jaipur, holding that information under the RTI Act cannot be denied merely because the records relate to events more than twenty years old. The Court clarified that Section 8(3) of the Right to Information Act actually supports disclosure after twenty years rather than blocking it. This ruling is highly relevant for anyone considering challenging second appellate authority order in RTI matters in High Court or filing an appeal before High Court for RTI in Jaipur Rajasthan. Case Title, Date of Judgment and Case Number Case Title: Dr. Mahipal Singh Sihag vs State Public Information Officer Cum Commissioner & AnotherCase Number: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5616/2022Court: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at JaipurJudge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sameer JainDate of Judgment: 21 April 2026 Background of the RTI Dispute The petitioner had filed an RTI application seeking service-related information regarding a third-party public servant, including joining date, retirement date, office orders and note sheets. The Public Information Officer rejected the request stating that the matter related to a third party and concerned events more than twenty years old. The first appeal was dismissed, and thereafter the Rajasthan State Information Commission, Jaipur, acting as the second appellate authority, also rejected the appeal on 18.12.2021. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner approached the Jaipur High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Jaipur High Court Findings on RTI Law The Jaipur High Court strongly criticised the reasoning adopted by the appellate authorities. The Court held that Section 8(3) of the RTI Act is a “sunset clause”, meaning that after twenty years most exemptions lose force and disclosure should ordinarily be allowed. Therefore, using the twenty-year rule as a ground to deny information was legally incorrect. The Court further observed that where third-party information is involved, the authority must follow the procedure under Section 11 of the RTI Act by issuing notice to the concerned third party and balancing privacy rights with public interest. The second appellate authority failed to follow this mandatory legal process. Final Order Passed by High Court The Jaipur High Court quashed the order dated 18.12.2021 passed by the second appellate authority. The Court directed the competent authority to supply the requested information to the petitioner within sixty days. It also directed the Registrar (Judicial) to send a copy of the judgment to the Rajasthan State Information Commission, Jaipur for compliance. Why This Judgment is Important for RTI Applicants in Rajasthan This judgment is a strong precedent for citizens seeking transparency. It confirms that when an unjust order is passed by the Information Commission, parties may consider challenging second appellate authority order in RTI matters in High Court. It also strengthens the legal route of filing an appeal before High Court for RTI in Jaipur Rajasthan where statutory authorities misinterpret the RTI Act. For litigants and advocates dealing with RTI disputes, this ruling from the Jaipur High Court sends a clear message that authorities must act according to law and cannot reject applications on arbitrary grounds  Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur

Section 153C Proceedings & Taxability of Agricultural Land

Section 153C Proceedings & Taxability of Agricultural Land The Rajasthan High Court, in Superb Infotech Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT (D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 43/2019), has delivered a significant ruling clarifying the scope of Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the taxability of agricultural land transactions. This judgment reinforces that reassessment proceedings under Section 153C cannot be initiated casually and must strictly comply with legal prerequisites, especially the existence of incriminating material discovered during a valid search. The Court held that merely finding documents such as partnership deeds or dissolution deeds during a search on a third party does not automatically justify invoking Section 153C. There must be a clear nexus between the seized material and undisclosed income of the assessee for the relevant assessment year. In this case, the Assessing Officer failed to establish such linkage, and no incriminating material relating to the assessee’s income for A.Y. 2007–08 was found. Therefore, the entire reassessment proceeding was declared invalid. Another crucial aspect addressed was whether profit from the sale of agricultural land could be taxed as business income or capital gains. The Court observed that the land in question was rural agricultural land located beyond prescribed municipal limits, and hence did not fall within the definition of a “capital asset” under Section 2(14). It further clarified that a single transaction of sale does not amount to an “adventure in the nature of trade,” especially in the absence of frequent buying and selling activities. Importantly, the judgment reiterates the principle laid down by the Supreme Court that no addition can be made in completed assessments without incriminating material found during search proceedings. It also emphasizes that Section 153C cannot be used as a substitute for reassessment under Sections 147/148 when no new evidence is available. In conclusion, this ruling strengthens taxpayer protection by ensuring that tax authorities follow due process before reopening assessments. It also provides clarity on the tax treatment of rural agricultural land, confirming that such transactions, when meeting statutory conditions, remain outside the scope of capital gains taxation.  Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur

Legal Heirs Can Continue Criminal Appeal After Death of Victim: Jaipur High Court Clarifies Law

Legal Heirs Can Continue Criminal Appeal After Death of Victim: Rajasthan High Court Clarifies Law The Rajasthan High Court has recently delivered a significant judgment that strengthens the rights of victims and their families in criminal proceedings. The Court clearly held that legal heirs of a deceased victim can continue a criminal appeal against acquittal, even after the death of the original complainant. This decision brings much-needed clarity to an area where there was confusion due to gaps in the law. In the case before the Court, the original complainant had filed a criminal case alleging fraud, forgery, and conspiracy related to land mutation. After trial, the accused were acquitted, and the complainant filed an appeal. However, during the pendency of the appeal, the complainant passed away. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as “abated” due to her death. The legal heirs then approached the High Court challenging this decision. The central issue before the Court was whether legal heirs of a deceased victim can continue an appeal filed against acquittal. The Court examined the definition of “victim” under Section 2(wa) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which clearly includes legal heirs and guardians. Based on this, the Court held that legal heirs step into the shoes of the victim and therefore have the right to continue legal proceedings. Further, the Court relied on the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which gives victims the right to appeal against acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or inadequate compensation. The Court interpreted this provision in a liberal and progressive manner, emphasizing that the term “victim” should not be restricted and must include legal representatives. One of the key legal conflicts in this case was with Section 394 CrPC, which deals with abatement of appeals on the death of the appellant. Traditionally, this section allows continuation of appeals only when the accused dies, permitting their relatives to pursue the appeal. However, it does not explicitly provide the same right to the legal heirs of a victim. The High Court resolved this conflict by adopting a purposive interpretation of the law. It held that the absence of explicit provision in Section 394 CrPC should not defeat the substantive rights granted to victims under Section 372. The Court also relied on recent Supreme Court judgments which have recognized the rights of victims and their heirs to continue appeals and prosecution. Importantly, the Court observed that denying such a right to victims’ families would create inequality and may violate Article 14 of the Constitution. While relatives of an accused can continue appeals to protect their honour, denying the same right to victims’ families would be unjust. Based on this reasoning, the High Court set aside the order of abatement and restored the appeal. It allowed the legal heirs to file an application seeking permission to continue the appeal, which the lower court must decide on merits. The Court also made an important recommendation to the legislature, highlighting that Section 394 CrPC should be amended to explicitly allow legal heirs of victims to continue appeals after death. This observation shows a progressive approach towards victim rights in the criminal justice system. In conclusion, this judgment is a landmark step in strengthening victim-centric justice in India. It ensures that legal proceedings do not end abruptly due to the death of a victim and that their family members can continue the fight for justice. This ruling will have a wide impact on criminal appeals, especially in cases involving acquittal, and provides a clear legal pathway for legal heirs to pursue justice.  Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur

Rajasthan High Court: Plea of Alibi Not Considerable at Section 319 CrPC Stage

Rajasthan High Court Plea of Alibi Not Considerable at Section 319 CrPC Stage The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 3521/2019, through reportable order dated 25.03.2026, upheld the Trial Court’s order summoning the petitioners under Section 319 CrPC in a murder case. The petitioners argued that they were not present at the place of occurrence and relied on a CID (CB) investigation supporting their plea of alibi. However, the Court held that the plea of alibi is a matter of defence and cannot be considered at the stage of taking cognizance. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court clarified that under Section 319 CrPC, an accused can be summoned if evidence indicates involvement, even if not charge-sheeted. Since the FIR and witness statements clearly named the petitioners, the Court found sufficient material to proceed and dismissed the petition. Prelude: Supreme Court Directions and Background of the Case The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 3521/2019, dealt with an important issue concerning the scope of Section 319 CrPC and the plea of alibi. The matter came up before the Court pursuant to directions issued by the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar & Ors. vs State of Rajasthan, wherein High Courts were directed to prioritise long-pending criminal matters, especially where interim orders had stalled trials involving serious offences like murder and rape. In compliance with these directions, the High Court took up the present petition, which challenged an order passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ajmer, allowing an application under Section 319 CrPC and summoning the petitioners as additional accused. Challenge to Section 319 CrPC Cognizance Order The petitioners challenged the order dated 15.01.2019 whereby the Trial Court had taken cognizance against them under various IPC provisions including Sections 147, 148, 302, 307, and 120B. The case arose from an incident dated 10.11.2016, followed by an FIR lodged the next day by the wife of the deceased, wherein the petitioners were named along with other accused persons. However, during investigation, the CID (CB) found that the petitioners were not present at the place of occurrence. One petitioner was stated to be 5 km away, while the other was in Pushkar, approximately 15 km away. Based on this, an application under Section 169 CrPC was filed, and the Magistrate ordered their release. Despite this, during trial, based on the statement of PW-4 (wife of the deceased), the Trial Court exercised its powers under Section 319 CrPC and summoned the petitioners. Arguments of Parties: Alibi vs Evidentiary Threshold The petitioners high court lawyer in jaipur argued that the Trial Court failed to consider the CID (CB) investigation which supported their plea of alibi. They relied on Supreme Court judgments such as Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Jogendra Yadav v. State of Bihar, contending that more than a prima facie case is required under Section 319 CrPC and that relevant investigative material must be considered. On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor and the complainant argued that the FIR and statements under Section 161 CrPC clearly named the petitioners with specific overt acts. They contended that at the stage of cognizance, the Court is not required to evaluate the defence or test the credibility of evidence. Reliance was placed on Sandeep Kumar v. State of Haryana and Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, emphasizing that courts have the power to summon additional accused if evidence indicates their involvement. Court’s Analysis: Scope of Section 319 CrPC and Plea of Alibi The High Court undertook a detailed analysis of Section 319 CrPC and reiterated that the provision empowers the Court to summon any person who appears, from the evidence, to have committed an offence, even if not charge-sheeted by the police. A crucial issue before the Court was whether the plea of alibi could be considered at the stage of taking cognizance. The Court categorically held that alibi is a defence that must be proved during trial and cannot be examined at the stage of summoning under Section 319 CrPC. It relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2025), which clarified that unproven defence material cannot override prosecution evidence at the threshold stage. The Court further observed that the standard under Section 319 CrPC is higher than a mere prima facie case but does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. If evidence such as eyewitness testimony indicates involvement, the Court is justified in summoning the accused. Conclusion: Petition Dismissed, Alibi to Be Tested at Trial Stage The Rajasthan High Court concluded that there was sufficient material on record, including FIR and witness statements, to justify summoning the petitioners under Section 319 CrPC. It held that the defence of alibi cannot be considered at this stage and must be tested during trial. Accordingly, the criminal miscellaneous petition was dismissed, and the order of the Trial Court was upheld. However, considering that the petitioners had earlier been released under Section 169 CrPC, the Court granted relief by directing that petitioner No. 2 shall not be arrested if he appears before the Trial Court and furnishes bail bonds. The Court also clarified that its observations are limited to the adjudication under Section 319 CrPC and shall not affect the final appreciation of evidence during trial.