Category: Rajasthan High Court Jaipur

Rajasthan High Court Allows Re-Medical Examination in Police Telecommunication Operator Recruitment Due to Weight Discrepancy

Rajasthan High Court Allows Re-Medical Examination in Police Telecommunication Operator Recruitment Due to Weight Discrepancy The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1612/2026, dealt with an important issue concerning recruitment eligibility and medical assessment in the police telecommunication operator recruitment process. The petitioner, Anushka Sonwal, had applied for the post of Constable Police Telecommunication Operator under the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989, pursuant to an advertisement dated 09.04.2025. She claimed that she had secured a suitable position in the merit list and belonged to the SC Female category, fulfilling all required qualifications for the post. However, during the Physical Measurement Test, she was declared ineligible on the ground that her recorded weight was 43.30 kg, which was below the prescribed minimum requirement of 47.5 kg.  The petitioner challenged the disqualification by producing a health certificate issued shortly after the rejection by a Medical Officer from a Government Hospital at Jhalana Doongri, Jaipur, which certified her weight as 48 kg. The petitioner argued that there was a clear discrepancy between the weight measurements taken by two different authorities, and therefore she sought an opportunity for re-medical examination by an independent medical board. The counsel submitted that a fresh assessment by experts at AIIMS would help resolve the factual dispute regarding her eligibility. While considering the matter, the High Court observed that writ jurisdiction is generally not invoked in cases involving disputed questions of fact, particularly those related to physical measurements or medical fitness. Nevertheless, the Court took note of the special circumstances of the case, namely that a government medical officer had issued a certificate indicating that the petitioner met the prescribed weight requirement within a short span of time after she was declared ineligible. Taking a balanced approach, the Court granted liberty to the petitioner to undergo a fresh medical examination by a Medical Board to be constituted by AIIMS, Jodhpur. The order directed that the petitioner must submit an application within seven days along with a demand draft of Rs. 10,000 in favour of the Superintendent of AIIMS, Jodhpur, following which the medical board would assess her weight within a stipulated period. The Court further clarified that if the AIIMS medical experts certify that the petitioner’s weight is 48 kg or more, she would be entitled to submit a representation before the concerned recruitment authorities, who must then consider her case strictly in accordance with law. Importantly, the Court emphasized that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the recruitment dispute and had only provided a procedural remedy to resolve the factual inconsistency. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of with these directions, leaving the final decision to the competent authorities based on the outcome of the medical examination.

Section 17-B Industrial Disputes Act: Rajasthan High Court Clarifies Workman Entitlement to Last Drawn Wages, Not Minimum Wages During Pendency

Section 17-B Industrial Disputes Act: Rajasthan High Court Clarifies Workman Entitlement to Last Drawn Wages, Not Minimum Wages During Pendency The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur, in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 113/2025, delivered an important ruling clarifying the scope of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the entitlement of a workman to wages during the pendency of litigation. The case arose from a dispute involving the University of Rajasthan and a workman, where the primary issue was whether a workman is entitled to minimum wages or only the last drawn wages while the employer’s challenge to a Labour Court award is pending before the High Court. The Court examined earlier precedents and statutory provisions to determine the correct interpretation of the law.  The Bench observed that the controversy was no longer res integra because earlier Division Bench decisions had already settled that during the pendency of proceedings, the workman is entitled to wages based on the last drawn salary rather than revised pay scales or enhanced minimum wages. The Court relied on prior judgments, including cases relating to Gram Panchayat Manoharpura and other authorities, which held that the purpose of Section 17-B is to provide subsistence support to the workman so that he does not suffer financial hardship while defending litigation. This payment acts as a safeguard against starvation but does not create a right to increased or revised wages.  While the respondent argued that minimum wages fixed by the State should be treated as maintenance allowance, the Court rejected this interpretation. Referring to judicial precedents, the Bench clarified that Section 17-B grants a statutory right to receive “full wages last drawn,” and although constitutional courts may in exceptional circumstances grant a higher amount in the interest of justice, such directions remain outside the strict framework of Section 17-B. Therefore, equating minimum wages with maintenance allowance was found to be inconsistent with the statutory scheme.  A significant aspect of the judgment was the Court’s interpretation of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The Bench held that minimum wages apply only to persons who are actually employed and working in an industry. A workman whose termination is under challenge and who is not presently in service cannot claim minimum wages merely because litigation is pending. Instead, during this period of non-employment, the legal mechanism available is subsistence allowance under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. This distinction was crucial in setting aside the Single Judge’s direction that required payment of minimum wages during the pendency of the writ petition.  Consequently, the Division Bench partly allowed the appeal and modified the earlier order. It ruled that the employer must continue to pay the workman the full wages last drawn, along with any admissible maintenance allowance, until the main petition is finally decided. However, payment of revised minimum wages or increments during this period was held to be beyond the scope of Section 17-B. The Court also requested expeditious disposal of the pending petition before the Single Judge to ensure timely resolution of the dispute.  Overall, the judgment reinforces a consistent judicial approach that Section 17-B is a protective provision intended to sustain a workman during litigation but not to enhance his financial entitlement beyond the last drawn wages. By distinguishing between subsistence allowance and minimum wages, the Rajasthan High Court clarified the limits of judicial discretion and ensured that the statutory framework of the Industrial Disputes Act is interpreted strictly while still balancing the interests of both employers and employees.   Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

Rajasthan High Court Holds That Short Absence Is Not Desertion: CRPF Constable Reinstated

Rajasthan High Court Holds That Short Absence Is Not Desertion: CRPF Constable Reinstated The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, has delivered an important judgment clarifying the legal distinction between desertion and unauthorised absence in disciplined forces. In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7778/2006, the Court set aside the removal of a CRPF constable who had been wrongly treated as a deserter for a short period of absence. The judgment reaffirms that temporary absence, followed by voluntary rejoining of duty, does not amount to desertion under the CRPF Act, 1949  The petitioner was appointed as a Constable (GD) in the Central Reserve Police Force in 1995 and had a strong service record. During his tenure, he was repeatedly appreciated for his performance, including sensitive deployments during post-riot duties in Gujarat and rescue and relief operations during the Bhuj earthquake. Despite this, a charge-sheet was issued against him in 2002 alleging desertion from training, unauthorised stay outside the camp, misconduct during training, and habitual indiscipline. Based on these allegations, the disciplinary authority imposed the extreme penalty of removal from service, which was later upheld in appeal and revision. The core issue before the High Court was whether the petitioner’s absence for about twenty days, which was supported by medical evidence and followed by voluntary resumption of duty, could legally be treated as desertion. The Court examined the scheme of the CRPF Act, 1949, particularly Sections 9 and 10, and observed that the law makes a clear distinction between desertion and absence without leave. Desertion is classified as a more heinous offence and requires animus deserendi, meaning a deliberate and permanent intention to abandon service. Absence without leave, on the other hand, is a lesser offence and does not automatically become desertion. The Court noted that the charge-sheet itself admitted that the petitioner rejoined duty on his own within a short period. This admitted fact completely negated any intention to permanently abandon service. The Court held that once voluntary rejoining is established, the essential ingredient of desertion is missing, rendering the charge legally unsustainable. Branding such a short absence as desertion was held to be a clear case of non-application of mind. The High Court also found serious procedural lapses in the departmental enquiry. Despite repeated requests, the petitioner was not supplied with relied-upon documents, and he was denied an effective opportunity to examine defence witnesses. The Enquiry Officer ignored unimpeachable medical records showing that the petitioner was suffering from acute renal pain and had undergone hospital treatment during the relevant period. The illness of his wife was also supported by documentary evidence, yet these mitigating circumstances were brushed aside without reasons. Further, the allegation that the petitioner stayed outside the camp without permission was found to be completely false, as the respondents’ own records showed that written permission had been granted to him earlier. The charge relating to misconduct during training was also unsupported by evidence, as training records reflected good conduct and high performance. The Court observed that earlier minor punishments could not be used to label the petitioner as habitually indisciplined so as to justify removal from service. The High Court strongly criticised the appellate and revisional authorities for passing cryptic and non-speaking orders. It held that statutory remedies lose their purpose if authorities fail to apply independent mind and merely endorse earlier decisions mechanically. The punishment of removal from service was held to be shockingly disproportionate, especially when imposed on a constable with a proven record of dedication and gallantry, and where the alleged misconduct arose largely from medical exigencies. Ultimately, the Rajasthan High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the removal order along with all consequential appellate and revisional orders. The respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and seniority. However, the Court limited the relief to notional benefits and denied actual back wages for the intervening period. The entire exercise was directed to be completed within sixty days from receipt of the judgment. This judgment is significant for service jurisprudence in uniformed forces. It reinforces that every unauthorised absence is not desertion, that intention to permanently abandon service is the decisive factor, and that disciplinary authorities must strictly follow statutory safeguards. The ruling serves as a reminder that while discipline is vital, it cannot be enforced at the cost of fairness, proportionality, and the rule of law. Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal

JVVNL Forcing Plot Owners to buy electricity from builder is illegal : Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench

JVVNL Forcing Plot Owners to buy electricity from builder is illegal : Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench Janak Singh Hada Vs State of Rajasthan & Others and Connected Matters D.B. Civil Writ Petition Number 7445/2025 Date of Judgment : 07.01.2026 In a significant judgment protecting the rights of homeowners, the Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has granted relief to plot owners of Vatika Infotech City who were denied individual electricity connections for years. The case arose from a long-standing dispute where residents of a JDA-approved colony were forced to purchase electricity from private developer-linked companies instead of receiving direct domestic electricity connections from Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (JVVNL). The High Court’s order dated 07 January 2026 has clarified the legal position on single point electricity connections, private monopoly, and the statutory duty of distribution companies. Vatika Infotech City is a large residential township in Jaipur with more than 3,500 plots approved by the Jaipur Development Authority. Despite residents owning freehold plots and having constructed houses on their own land, JVVNL consistently refused to provide individual electricity connections. Instead, residents were compelled to buy electricity through sub-meters installed by private companies associated with the builder, which were operating without any licence under the Electricity Act, 2003. This practice continued for more than fifteen years, causing serious hardship to residents. Aggrieved plot owners, including Janak Singh Hada and other similarly placed residents, approached the Rajasthan High Court by filing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petition challenged Regulation 6.3 of the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Electricity Supply Code and Connected Matters) Regulations, 2021, alleging that it was being misused to justify an illegal monopoly of electricity distribution by non-licensee private companies. The petitioners also challenged the refusal letter dated 17.11.2023 by JVVNL, which directed residents to obtain electricity from the developer instead of granting direct connections. The petitioners argued that under Section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003, every distribution licensee has a statutory duty to supply electricity to an owner or occupier of premises upon application. They further contended that Regulation 6.3 itself contains a proviso that clearly protects the right of an individual consumer to demand direct electricity supply from the distribution licensee. Despite this, JVVNL continued to deny connections, citing reasons such as “single point connection” and “non-electrification of the colony,” while simultaneously allowing private companies to sell electricity within the same colony. After examining the pleadings, documents, and the connected writ petitions, the Rajasthan High Court made crucial observations. The Court held that JVVNL, being a distribution licensee under the Electricity Act, cannot shift its statutory responsibility onto a private developer. The Court found that Regulation 6.3 does not prohibit individual electricity connections and, in fact, mandates release of direct connections when demanded by eligible applicants. The practice of forcing residents to buy electricity from a builder through a single point connection was held to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and contrary to law. The High Court further recognised that electricity is an essential service and forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Denial of electricity to residents who have complied with all requirements and are willing to pay applicable charges was found to be a clear violation of constitutional and statutory rights. The Court rejected the argument that the colony was not electrified, observing that such a stand was neither fair nor justified when electricity was already being supplied through private intermediaries. By its final order, the Rajasthan High Court directed Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited to issue independent electricity connections to the petitioners after completion of necessary formalities and payment of applicable charges. The Court ordered that such connections must be released within a period of two months from the date of the order. While the challenge to the constitutional validity of Regulation 6.3 was kept open for consideration in an appropriate case, the Court granted substantial relief to the residents by enforcing their right to direct electricity supply. This judgment is extremely important for plot owners and residents living in private colonies across Rajasthan. It sends a clear message that developers cannot run parallel electricity distribution systems without a licence and that distribution companies cannot abdicate their statutory duties. The decision also curbs the practice of creating illegal monopolies over essential services like electricity and strengthens consumer rights in urban residential colonies. In conclusion, the Rajasthan High Court’s decision in the Vatika Infotech City electricity case reaffirms that electricity is not a privilege controlled by builders but a legal right guaranteed under law. Distribution licensees are bound to serve consumers directly, and regulatory provisions cannot be misused to deny citizens access to basic necessities. This judgment will serve as a strong precedent for similar disputes involving denial of electricity connections in developer-led townships across the state. Counsel for the Petitioners Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

BIFR Scheme Cannot Bind State Without Express Approval Under SICA, Rules Rajasthan High Court

BIFR Scheme Cannot Bind State Without Express Approval Under SICA, Rules Rajasthan High Court Lords Chloro Alkali Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 990/2018Judgment dated 19 December 2025 The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, has dismissed a writ petition filed by Lords Chloro Alkali Ltd., holding that a rehabilitation scheme sanctioned by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction cannot be enforced against the State Government in the absence of express consent as required under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The Court also found that prolonged non-compliance by the company itself disentitled it from any relief under writ jurisdiction. The petition arose from demand notices issued in 2017 by the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation for recovery of dues relating to an Interest Free Sales Tax Loan. The company contended that these demands violated a rehabilitation scheme sanctioned by BIFR in November 2006, under which the sales tax liability was settled at 26.58 per cent of the principal amount, payable in instalments without interest. On this basis, the company sought quashing of the demand notices and enforcement of the sanctioned scheme. Tracing the background, the Court noted that the company had been declared a sick industrial unit in 2002 and that a final rehabilitation scheme was approved in 2006 after circulation to various stakeholders. While the scheme contemplated substantial concessions, including in respect of sales tax dues, the State Government and its nodal agency, RIICO, disputed that any binding consent had ever been granted for such concessions. The High Court examined whether the scheme could bind the State in the absence of express consent under Section 19(2) of SICA. It found that no document or record showed affirmative approval by the competent authority of the State Government for waiver or reduction of sales tax liabilities. The order of BIFR itself recorded that RIICO had only stated that the proposal was under consideration and that settlements below the principal amount were generally not accepted, which, according to the Court, could not be treated as consent. Rejecting the argument of deemed consent, the Court held that internal correspondence, file notings, or prolonged silence cannot substitute the statutory requirement of express consent when public revenue is involved. Relying on settled judicial precedents, the Court reiterated that BIFR has no power to compel a State Government to grant fiscal concessions without such consent, and that schemes lacking this requirement are unenforceable against the State. The Court also took serious note of the petitioner’s conduct. It observed that despite the scheme prescribing a clear repayment schedule from 2006 onwards, the company had failed to make any payment for nearly eleven years and deposited an amount only in 2017. This prolonged non-compliance, the Court held, amounted to a fundamental breach of the scheme and eroded any equitable basis for invoking writ jurisdiction. On the issue of repeal of SICA, the Court acknowledged that repeal does not automatically nullify sanctioned schemes. However, it clarified that only legally binding components of a scheme survive repeal, and a provision that was never enforceable against the State for want of consent cannot be revived later. Applying the doctrine of laches, the High Court held that the petitioner’s delay and inaction were fatal to its claim. It observed that discretionary relief under Article 226 cannot be granted to a party that has failed to perform its own obligations and approaches the Court after an inordinate lapse of time. For these reasons, the Jaipur Bench concluded that the writ petition lacked merit and dismissed it, thereby upholding the demand notices issued by RIICO and reinforcing the principle that State consent is mandatory before any rehabilitation scheme can impose financial concessions affecting public revenue.  

Rajasthan High Court Rejects Third Bail Plea of Police Constable in Bharatpur Murder Case, Relies on Call Records Showing Criminal Conspiracy

Rajasthan High Court Rejects Third Bail Plea of Police Constable in Bharatpur Murder Case, Relies on Call Records Showing Criminal Conspiracy Case Title: Ravindra Singh S/o Rambharosi v. State of RajasthanCourt: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at JaipurCitation: S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous III Bail Application No. 10667/2025Date of Judgment: December, 2025 The present judgment arises from the third bail application moved by the accused-petitioner Ravindra Singh under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. The petitioner was arrested in connection with FIR No. 218/2023 registered at Police Station Halena, District Bharatpur, for serious offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The matter was heard and decided by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Praveer Bhatnagar, with the Court delivering a reasoned and complete judgment declining bail. The petitioner contended that he had been falsely implicated in the case and that no direct or substantive evidence existed to establish his role in the alleged conspiracy leading to the murder of Kuldeep Singh and the grievous injuries caused to Vijaypal. It was argued that his earlier bail application had been rejected with liberty to renew the prayer after recording the statement of the injured witness, and that subsequent developments, including material witnesses turning hostile, justified reconsideration. Emphasis was also placed on the petitioner’s long incarceration and his status as a police constable. The State and the complainant strongly opposed the bail plea, drawing the Court’s attention to the background of the case and the alleged motive. It was argued that the petitioner is the real brother of Kripal Singh, whose murder had preceded the present incident, and that the killing of Kuldeep Singh was an act of revenge carried out pursuant to a criminal conspiracy. The prosecution relied heavily on call detail records collected during investigation, which indicated sustained and repeated contact between the petitioner and the principal assailants before and after the incident. It was further pointed out that the bail application of a similarly placed co-accused, Aaditya, had already been dismissed by the High Court, and that the petitioner’s case stood on identical footing. Upon a careful perusal of the material on record, the High Court examined the call detail analysis placed by the investigating agency. The judgment records that the petitioner had made and received a significant number of calls with key co-accused over an extended period, clearly suggesting continuous communication. The Court took note of the fact that these call records formed part of an elaborate investigation and prima facie supported the prosecution’s allegation of conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC. The Court found that such evidence could not be lightly brushed aside at the stage of considering bail, particularly in a case involving allegations of murder motivated by revenge. The High Court also placed weight on the principle of parity, observing that the case of the petitioner was not distinguishable from that of the co-accused whose bail had already been rejected. The Court held that, in the absence of any new or exceptional circumstance, there was no justification to take a different view in the petitioner’s third bail application. The seriousness of the offence, the nature of allegations, and the prima facie material indicating a conspiratorial role weighed decisively against the grant of bail. Concluding its analysis, the Court held that, at the present stage, it was not inclined to enlarge the accused-petitioner on bail. Accordingly, the third bail application was dismissed. The judgment underscores the Rajasthan High Court’s consistent approach that in cases involving grave offences like murder coupled with conspiracy, sustained call-based linkage between accused persons can constitute strong prima facie material sufficient to deny bail, especially when earlier bail pleas have already been rejected on merits. Read complete order here

High Court Upholds Acquittal Where Evidence Is Conflicting — Jaipur Bench Confirms Trial Court Finding

High Court Upholds Acquittal Where Evidence Is Conflicting — Jaipur Bench Confirms Trial Court Finding Case Title: State of Rajasthan v. Ramkesh & Mukesh — D.B. Criminal Leave to Appeal No. 146/2024.Date of Judgment: 11 December 2025. The facts of the case, as recorded by the trial court, relate to an incident on 20 September 2014 near a water tank at Lavana in which the deceased, Krishna Kumar, allegedly suffered injuries after an altercation and a subsequent vehicle impact. The prosecution case, set out in the police report and charge sheet, accused the respondents of causing grievous injuries and of an overt act of running the deceased down by hitting him with a Bolero vehicle (bearing registration ARJ-14-Y-5017) and assault by companions, allegations which ultimately led to investigation under sections 323, 307 and 302/34 IPC. The trial court framed and examined charges and, after trial, recorded an order of acquittal on 29 March 2023. The trial court’s judgment, as reproduced in the record, proceeded from an analysis of the ocular testimony, documentary material and medical reports relied upon by prosecution and defence. The court found divergences in the statements of prosecution witnesses, delays and discrepancies in reporting the incident to police, and material differences between various eyewitness accounts about the sequence of events, the role of the accused, and whether the vehicle impact as alleged was a deliberate act. The trial court also examined medical evidence and the injury pattern, and considered whether those materials compelled the conclusion of homicidal intent or guilty participation beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal by the State through a petition for leave, the High Court undertook a re-appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence within the narrow compass permitted on appeals against acquittal. The Bench reviewed witness depositions, the medical record and attendant circumstances, noting contradictions in key witnesses’ versions about timing, the nature of blows, presence and role of the accused at the spot, and the sequence between an altercation and the vehicle event. The Court observed that several prosecution witnesses gave differing accounts regarding whether the deceased was assaulted first, whether the Bolero struck the deceased intentionally, and whether the accused were driving the vehicle that allegedly caused the injuries. The High Court also engaged with the medical evidence and the contents of injury reports; while injuries and hospital records were on the file, the Bench recorded that the medical report did not, by itself, conclusively establish the prosecution’s pleaded narrative of deliberate homicide by vehicle impact. The Court further noted the trial court’s legitimate evaluation of delays in lodging the report, discrepancies about immediate police attendance, and the absence of convincing contemporaneous corroboration that linked the accused to the fatal result in a manner that excluded all reasonable doubt. In applying principles governing appellate interference with acquittal orders, the Bench relied upon the well-settled tests reflected in recent precedents, including the requirement that an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal unless the trial court’s view is perverse, based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where no two reasonable views are possible and the only possible conclusion on the record is guilt. On re-appreciation, the High Court found that the trial court’s view was a possible view legitimately open on the evidence and that there was no patent perversity or omission warranting reversal. Concluding its examination, the Jaipur Bench held that the trial court’s acquittal suffered from no legal or factual infirmity sufficient to grant the State leave to appeal. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused and the order of acquittal dated 29 March 2023 was affirmed; a copy of this decision was directed to be sent to the trial court for information. Read complete order here By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal

Rajasthan High Court Upholds Trial Court’s Direction to Restore FDR Funds: Axis Bank’s Petition Rejected

Rajasthan High Court Upholds Trial Court’s Direction to Restore FDR Funds: Axis Bank’s Petition Rejected Case Title: Axis Bank Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., S.B. Criminal Misc. (Petn.) No. 7763/2025.Date of Judgment: 09/12/2025. Bank appropriated funds from a Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) that had been ordered by the trial court to be kept in the name of the Court pending trial, and the present petition challenged the trial court’s direction (dated 16.10.2025) to refund/deposit the appropriated amount. The petitioning bank relied on an order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Jaipur dated 20.04.2018 which had permitted temporary appropriation of the sale proceeds deposited with the bank in an FDR, and contended that the DRT order entitled it to appropriate the funds without further permission from the trial court. The criminal proceedings arose from FIR No. 43/2011 registered at Police Station Bapawar (Kota Rural) concerning alleged fraud, cheating and criminal breach of trust in relation to agricultural produce entrusted by hundreds of farmers. The trial court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 457 Cr.P.C., had on 07.07.2012 ordered auction of perishable seized produce and directed that the sale proceeds be deposited in an FDR in the name of the Court. The bank’s later application (12.04.2013) to appropriate the FDR proceeds was rejected by the trial court on 03.06.2013, and an S.B. petition filed by the bank was subsequently withdrawn with liberty to initiate recovery proceedings. The bank thereafter filed Original Application No.241/2015 before the DRT and obtained I.A. No.142/2018. The DRT, while permitting temporary appropriation, recorded that such appropriation would be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the defendants and subject to conditions the tribunal might impose. The Rajasthan High Court’s record shows, however, that the orders of the trial court (07.07.2012 and 03.06.2013) and earlier orders of this Court were not placed before the DRT during those proceedings. On the basis of the DRT order, the petitioner-bank appropriated Rs.8,20,47,000/- from the FDR and deposited the balance. The trial court took the view that the appropriation was made in violation of its earlier orders and of orders of this Court, and therefore issued a direction dated 16.10.2025 requiring the bank to refund or re-deposit the appropriated amount with interest within seven days and issued notices to senior bank officials, including the Managing Director/CEO and the concerned Branch Manager, warning of appropriate action for non-compliance. The High Court examined the sequence of orders and petitions, including the trial court’s reasoned order under Section 457 Cr.P.C., the rejection of the bank’s interim withdrawal application, the bank’s withdrawn criminal misc. petition, and the DRT order. The Court noted that the DRT’s order appears to have been passed in ignorance of the earlier trial-court and High Court orders which had directed that the sale proceeds remain in FDR in the name of the Court. Because those earlier orders were not brought to the notice of the DRT, the DRT allowed temporary appropriation without that crucial context. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the record, the High Court held that the bank’s appropriation of the FDR amount without seeking fresh permission from the trial court was contrary to the orders dated 07.07.2012 and 03.06.2013. The Court emphasized that no one is above the law and that court orders must be obeyed. Applying these findings, the High Court found no error in the trial court’s impugned order and declined to interfere with it. Consequently, the criminal miscellaneous petition filed by Axis Bank failed and was rejected. The High Court disposed of the stay application and other pending applications, while observing that appropriate proceedings could have been initiated against the erring bank officials and that the court was sending a clear message that orders of the court must be respected. Read Complete Order here By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal

Jaipur High Court Affirms Acquittal in Alleged Murder Case: No Interference Warranted When Trial Court’s View Is a “Possible View” on Evidence

Jaipur High Court Affirms Acquittal in Alleged Murder Case: No Interference Warranted When Trial Court’s View Is a “Possible View” on Evidence Case Title: Raju Devi Bunkar v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., D.B. Criminal Appeal (Db) No. 302/2025 — Date of Judgment: 08/12/2025 The present appeal arises from the acquittal of respondent Govind in offences including Sections 302, 342 and 323 IPC by the trial court and the subsequent challenge to that order before the High Court. The factual matrix, as recorded in the judgment, shows that on 03.11.2012 a report (P.I.-11) was lodged regarding the death of Uttam Kumar and competing versions were placed on record by family witnesses and the accused’s side; the investigation culminated in charge-sheeting under various sections and ultimately resulted in the trial court recording acquittal on 24.04.2025. 203000003022025_5 The appellate record recounts that multiple witnesses were examined in trial — including eyewitnesses, local persons and medical evidence — and that there were significant divergences in the statements and respective versions about the events of 03.11.2012. The High Court’s summary of evidence (see pages 4–6 of the file) highlights inconsistencies in eyewitness accounts, gaps in forensic/medical corroboration for homicidal assault, and particulars such as timing, injuries and the presence or absence of demonstrative indicia on the deceased’s person that bear on the reliability of the prosecution case. The learned trial court’s approach, as noticed by the Division Bench, was to closely evaluate the oral testimony presented and to find that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the trial court therefore returned a view favourable to the accused. The High Court adverted to the trial court’s reasoning, including the manner in which the trial court treated the discrepancies and the nature of corroboration tendered, and placed those findings in the context of appellate interference doctrine. In applying established appellate principles, the Bench relied on the Supreme Court guidance cited in the judgment (Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka and related authority), reiterating that an appellate court can disturb an acquittal only where the trial court’s view is patently perverse, is based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where no two reasonable views are possible — in short, where the only possible conclusion from the record is guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment reproduces and applies these principles to the facts of the case (see paragraph 13–14 of the judgment). After a considered re-appreciation of the record, the Division Bench concluded that the trial court’s view was a possible view which could reasonably be drawn from the evidence on record and that the scope for interference was therefore absent. The High Court recorded that neither legal nor factual infirmity of the nature required to overturn an acquittal was made out on the material before it, and accordingly the appellate challenge was dismissed and the trial court’s order of acquittal dated 24.04.2025 was held to be sustainable. The judgment directs that the decree be communicated to the trial court and is confined to the determination of the appeal under the criminal appellate jurisdiction; it does not re-open factual findings beyond the permissible limits of appellate review as spelled out in the authorities relied upon by the Bench. Read complete order here By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal

Rajasthan High Court Directs Consideration of Representation for Correction of Subject in RPSC Assistant Professor Application

Rajasthan High Court Directs Consideration of Representation for Correction of Subject in RPSC Assistant Professor Application Case Title: Archana Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18962/2025Date of Judgment: 06.12.2025 The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, through Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Kumar Jain, decided S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18962/2025 filed by Ms. Archana Chaudhary. The petitioner, aged about 33 years and resident of Jaipur, had approached the Court seeking relief in relation to her online application for the post of Assistant Professor (College Education) – 2025. Her grievance was that in Application No. 202549023583, her subject had been recorded as “Hindi” instead of “Geography,” which according to her did not match her academic qualification and earlier application record.  In the writ petition, the petitioner prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC) to correct the subject in her application from “Hindi” to “Geography.” She further sought a direction that her candidature be considered for the post of Assistant Professor in the subject of Geography and that she be permitted to participate in all subsequent stages of the recruitment process accordingly. Along with this, she requested that the Court quash and set aside the verbal or oral refusal allegedly made by the Commission in regard to consideration of her representation, and that the respondents be directed to pass a reasoned and speaking order on her representation dated 01.12.2025.  During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a Division Bench judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Harendra Gawaria and Ors., reported as 2022 Supreme (Raj.) 643. On the strength of this decision, it was submitted that the controversy raised by the petitioner already stood covered and resolved. Relying on this precedent, it was urged that the petitioner may at least be granted permission to submit an appropriate representation before the competent authority so that her grievance regarding correction of the subject and consideration of candidature could be examined in accordance with law.  The Court considered the grievance raised by the petitioner in the light of the submissions made. Instead of granting the substantive relief of direct correction of the subject in the application form or issuing a positive mandamus to treat the petitioner as a Geography candidate, the Court chose to dispose of the writ petition by providing a structured remedy through representation. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to submit a detailed representation to the respondents–authority within a period of three days, raising all grounds available to her with respect to the error in the subject and its impact on her candidature.  The Court also issued clear directions to the respondents–authority regarding how such representation was to be dealt with. It directed that the representation be considered and decided after making an enquiry about the grievances raised by the petitioner. This exercise was to be undertaken in the light of the Division Bench judgment in Union of India and Ors. v. Harendra Gawaria and Ors. (supra). The Court further directed that, in case the respondents chose to deviate from the position emerging from the said judgment or otherwise did not accept the petitioner’s claim, they must pass a reasoned and speaking order. This decision was to be taken within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of the representation and in any case before 15th December 2025.  The judgment also places an obligation on the respondents to communicate their decision to the petitioner. It is specifically recorded that the decision must be conveyed either by way of speed post or through e-mail, if the petitioner has provided an e-mail address in her representation. This direction ensures that the petitioner is informed of the outcome in a timely and verifiable manner, enabling her to take further steps, if necessary, without delay.  Finally, the Court preserved the petitioner’s right to seek further judicial remedy. It observed that if, after the decision on her representation, the petitioner still felt aggrieved, she would be at liberty to approach the Court again by filing a fresh petition. With these directions and observations, the writ petition, along with any pending applications, was disposed of.  Through this judgment, the Rajasthan High Court confined itself to providing a procedural route and a time-bound mechanism for redressal of the petitioner’s grievance regarding correction of the subject in her RPSC Assistant Professor (College Education) – 2025 application, without entering into or adjudicating upon the merits of the claim itself. Read complete order here By Advocate Bhuvesh Kumar Goyal