Category: Rajasthan High Court Jaipur

JDA vs Sai Darshan Hotels (2026): Rajasthan HC Upholds 15% Developed Land in Lieu of Compensation

JDA vs Sai Darshan Hotels (2026): Rajasthan HC Upholds 15% Developed Land in Lieu of Compensation The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 658/2010 decided a significant dispute concerning land acquisition compensation and the right to allotment of developed land in lieu of such compensation. The case arose from acquisition proceedings initiated in 1969 for land situated in Village Chainpura, Sanganer, Jaipur, culminating in an award dated 09.04.1981 granting monetary compensation to the original khatedars. Although the amount was determined and even deposited, it was never actually paid to the landowners, and possession of the land was taken over by the Jaipur Development Authority (JDA) in 1983. Over the years, multiple challenges to the acquisition proceedings were made by the original khatedars and subsequent stakeholders, all of which were dismissed up to the level of the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the respondent company, having acquired rights from earlier landholders, applied to the State Government in 2003 seeking allotment of 15% developed land in lieu of compensation under the prevailing State policy. This policy, particularly the circular dated 13.12.2001 (as amended in 2002), permitted such allotment subject to surrender of rights and withdrawal of litigation. Acting upon this, the respondent withdrew all pending cases, including proceedings before the Supreme Court, and complied with the conditions stipulated by the State. Pursuant to the policy, the State Government issued orders dated 12.05.2003 and 19.05.2003 directing allotment of Plot No. 7 admeasuring 9000 square meters at Airport Plaza, Jaipur, to the respondent. However, these orders were subsequently kept in abeyance by an order dated 23.06.2009, which led to the filing of a writ petition. The learned Single Judge allowed the petition and quashed the abeyance order, holding that the State was bound by the principle of promissory estoppel since the respondent had already acted upon the assurance by withdrawing litigation. In appeal, the JDA contended that the respondent had no valid claim to such allotment, alleging irregularities and asserting that the land had already been acquired and possession taken, leaving no scope for further benefits. It was also argued that the allotment caused financial loss to JDA and was based on improper actions by State authorities. However, the Division Bench, after examining the entire record and affidavits, found that neither the original compensation nor the enhanced compensation awarded by the Reference Court in 1990 had been paid or properly deposited. The Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal to reiterate that mere deposit of compensation does not amount to payment, and therefore, the right to compensation survives. The Court further held that the respondent, as an assignee of the original khatedars, was entitled to claim compensation in accordance with the State policy. Since the respondent had fulfilled all conditions, including withdrawal of litigation, the State Government was bound to honour its promise. The action of keeping the allotment order in abeyance was found to be arbitrary, amounting to giving with one hand and taking away with the other, which is impermissible in law. The Court also observed that the policy providing 15% developed land had already been upheld by the Supreme Court and was binding on the authorities, including JDA. Rejecting the objections raised by JDA, the Court held that the allotment orders had attained finality and could not be questioned on vague allegations. It was further clarified that earlier proceedings did not attract the doctrine of merger or res judicata, as observed by the Supreme Court, and therefore the matter could be examined independently on merits. Ultimately, the Division Bench found no illegality in the order of the learned Single Judge and upheld the respondent’s entitlement to 15% developed land. Accordingly, the Special Appeal filed by JDA was dismissed, and the Court directed JDA to implement the State Government’s orders dated 12.05.2003 and 19.05.2003 by allotting Plot No. 7 admeasuring 9000 square meters at Airport Plaza, Jaipur, to the respondent. The judgment reinforces the principles that non-payment of compensation preserves the right of landowners, that government policies must be implemented fairly, and that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies when a party has altered its position based on governmental assurances.   Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur

Rajasthan High Court Upholds Acquittal in Murder Case Due to Contradictory Circumstantial Evidence and Unexplained FIR Delay

Rajasthan High Court Upholds Acquittal in Murder Case Due to Contradictory Circumstantial Evidence and Unexplained FIR Delay State of Rajasthan v. Sampat & Anr., D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 363/2002, decided on 25 February 2026 (Raj HC, Jaipur Bench), reported in 2026:RJ-JP:8788-DB, per Mahendar Kumar Goyal & Sameer Jain, JJ. (Connected with: Kalyan Ram v. Sampat Singh & Anr., D.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 674/2001) The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 363/2002 and connected Criminal Revision Petition No. 674/2001, delivered its judgment on 25.02.2026, dismissing both the appeal filed by the State and the revision petition filed by the complainant. The case arose from Sessions Case No. 23/1999 decided by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kishangarh, District Ajmer, wherein the accused persons were acquitted of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution case was based on a written report dated 05.03.1999 submitted by Kalyan Ram, on the basis of which FIR No. 31/1999 was registered at Police Station Rupangarh, District Ajmer, for offences under Sections 302 and 34 IPC. It was alleged that the accused had committed the murder of Rupa Ram. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed and charges were framed. However, after trial, the learned trial court acquitted the accused, leading to the present appeal and revision before the High Court. Before the High Court, the State and the complainant argued that the trial court had failed to properly appreciate the circumstantial evidence and that the chain of circumstances clearly established the guilt of the accused. It was submitted that the postmortem report showed an ante-mortem head injury and that a lathi was recovered on the disclosure statement of one of the accused. It was also contended that the delay in lodging the FIR was not fatal to the prosecution case. On the other hand, the counsel for the accused supported the acquittal and argued that the prosecution evidence was contradictory and unreliable. The High Court carefully examined the evidence on record and noted that the case was entirely based on circumstantial evidence. It found material contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, particularly regarding what the deceased allegedly told them about the incident and who was responsible. The Court also observed that although the family members claimed to have known about the incident on the same night, the FIR was lodged after a delay of two days by a person who was neither a close family member nor a resident of the same village. No satisfactory explanation for this delay was provided. Further, the medical evidence did not fully support the prosecution version, as only a swelling on the skull was found and there were inconsistencies regarding the alleged dragging of the deceased. Importantly, the medical evidence suggested the possibility that the deceased might have suffered the fatal injury due to a fall, especially as there was evidence indicating consumption of alcohol. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the fatal injury was caused by the accused. In view of these findings, the High Court concluded that the trial court’s judgment of acquittal did not suffer from any perversity, illegality, or infirmity warranting interference in appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly, both the criminal appeal and the revision petition were dismissed, and the acquittal of the accused was upheld.   By Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

Rajasthan HC Rejects Sentence Suspension in POCSO Appeal Case

Rajasthan HC Rejects Sentence Suspension in POCSO Appeal Case Date of Order: 13.02.2026   The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, recently dealt with a significant suspension of sentence application filed by an accused convicted under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. The case arose from D.B. Criminal Misc. Suspension of Sentence Application No. 2047/2024, filed along with a criminal appeal by the accused Vishnu @ Vikram, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment by the Special Court, POCSO Act, Dausa. The conviction was primarily under Sections 5(l)(m)/6 of the POCSO Act, along with alternative provisions of the Indian Penal Code, for serious allegations involving a minor victim.  The applicant approached the High Court seeking suspension of sentence during the pendency of the appeal. The defence argued that the trial court had wrongly treated the victim as being below eleven years of age without sufficient evidence, and further contended that the allegations of rape were not medically corroborated. It was also submitted that there existed prior enmity between the parties, which allegedly resulted in false implication. On these grounds, the counsel requested the Court to grant relief and suspend the sentence until the appeal was decided.  The State strongly opposed the plea, emphasizing the seriousness of the offence and the material evidence available on record. Upon hearing both sides, the Division Bench carefully examined the trial court judgment dated 20.03.2024. The Court noted that the victim’s age had been determined based on the birth certificate (Exhibit P-16), which showed that she was below eleven years at the time of the offence. Further, the victim’s testimony as PW-2 contained specific allegations of repeated sexual assault. Importantly, forensic evidence played a crucial role, as the DNA profile obtained from semen found on the victim’s clothing matched with the DNA sample of the accused, strengthening the prosecution’s case.  Considering the gravity of the accusations, the age of the victim, and the supporting forensic material, the High Court held that this was not a fit case for granting suspension of sentence. The Bench observed that the nature of evidence and seriousness of the offence weighed against the applicant. Consequently, the application for suspension of sentence was dismissed, and the accused was directed to continue serving the sentence awarded by the trial court.  This order highlights the cautious approach adopted by courts in cases involving offences against children, especially where strong testimonial and scientific evidence is available. It reiterates that suspension of sentence in serious POCSO convictions is not granted as a matter of routine and depends heavily on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and the overall circumstances of the case.

Rajasthan High Court Allows Re-Medical Examination in Police Telecommunication Operator Recruitment Due to Weight Discrepancy

Rajasthan High Court Allows Re-Medical Examination in Police Telecommunication Operator Recruitment Due to Weight Discrepancy The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1612/2026, dealt with an important issue concerning recruitment eligibility and medical assessment in the police telecommunication operator recruitment process. The petitioner, Anushka Sonwal, had applied for the post of Constable Police Telecommunication Operator under the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989, pursuant to an advertisement dated 09.04.2025. She claimed that she had secured a suitable position in the merit list and belonged to the SC Female category, fulfilling all required qualifications for the post. However, during the Physical Measurement Test, she was declared ineligible on the ground that her recorded weight was 43.30 kg, which was below the prescribed minimum requirement of 47.5 kg.  The petitioner challenged the disqualification by producing a health certificate issued shortly after the rejection by a Medical Officer from a Government Hospital at Jhalana Doongri, Jaipur, which certified her weight as 48 kg. The petitioner argued that there was a clear discrepancy between the weight measurements taken by two different authorities, and therefore she sought an opportunity for re-medical examination by an independent medical board. The counsel submitted that a fresh assessment by experts at AIIMS would help resolve the factual dispute regarding her eligibility. While considering the matter, the High Court observed that writ jurisdiction is generally not invoked in cases involving disputed questions of fact, particularly those related to physical measurements or medical fitness. Nevertheless, the Court took note of the special circumstances of the case, namely that a government medical officer had issued a certificate indicating that the petitioner met the prescribed weight requirement within a short span of time after she was declared ineligible. Taking a balanced approach, the Court granted liberty to the petitioner to undergo a fresh medical examination by a Medical Board to be constituted by AIIMS, Jodhpur. The order directed that the petitioner must submit an application within seven days along with a demand draft of Rs. 10,000 in favour of the Superintendent of AIIMS, Jodhpur, following which the medical board would assess her weight within a stipulated period. The Court further clarified that if the AIIMS medical experts certify that the petitioner’s weight is 48 kg or more, she would be entitled to submit a representation before the concerned recruitment authorities, who must then consider her case strictly in accordance with law. Importantly, the Court emphasized that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the recruitment dispute and had only provided a procedural remedy to resolve the factual inconsistency. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of with these directions, leaving the final decision to the competent authorities based on the outcome of the medical examination.

Section 17-B Industrial Disputes Act: Rajasthan High Court Clarifies Workman Entitlement to Last Drawn Wages, Not Minimum Wages During Pendency

Section 17-B Industrial Disputes Act: Rajasthan High Court Clarifies Workman Entitlement to Last Drawn Wages, Not Minimum Wages During Pendency The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur, in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 113/2025, delivered an important ruling clarifying the scope of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the entitlement of a workman to wages during the pendency of litigation. The case arose from a dispute involving the University of Rajasthan and a workman, where the primary issue was whether a workman is entitled to minimum wages or only the last drawn wages while the employer’s challenge to a Labour Court award is pending before the High Court. The Court examined earlier precedents and statutory provisions to determine the correct interpretation of the law.  The Bench observed that the controversy was no longer res integra because earlier Division Bench decisions had already settled that during the pendency of proceedings, the workman is entitled to wages based on the last drawn salary rather than revised pay scales or enhanced minimum wages. The Court relied on prior judgments, including cases relating to Gram Panchayat Manoharpura and other authorities, which held that the purpose of Section 17-B is to provide subsistence support to the workman so that he does not suffer financial hardship while defending litigation. This payment acts as a safeguard against starvation but does not create a right to increased or revised wages.  While the respondent argued that minimum wages fixed by the State should be treated as maintenance allowance, the Court rejected this interpretation. Referring to judicial precedents, the Bench clarified that Section 17-B grants a statutory right to receive “full wages last drawn,” and although constitutional courts may in exceptional circumstances grant a higher amount in the interest of justice, such directions remain outside the strict framework of Section 17-B. Therefore, equating minimum wages with maintenance allowance was found to be inconsistent with the statutory scheme.  A significant aspect of the judgment was the Court’s interpretation of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The Bench held that minimum wages apply only to persons who are actually employed and working in an industry. A workman whose termination is under challenge and who is not presently in service cannot claim minimum wages merely because litigation is pending. Instead, during this period of non-employment, the legal mechanism available is subsistence allowance under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. This distinction was crucial in setting aside the Single Judge’s direction that required payment of minimum wages during the pendency of the writ petition.  Consequently, the Division Bench partly allowed the appeal and modified the earlier order. It ruled that the employer must continue to pay the workman the full wages last drawn, along with any admissible maintenance allowance, until the main petition is finally decided. However, payment of revised minimum wages or increments during this period was held to be beyond the scope of Section 17-B. The Court also requested expeditious disposal of the pending petition before the Single Judge to ensure timely resolution of the dispute.  Overall, the judgment reinforces a consistent judicial approach that Section 17-B is a protective provision intended to sustain a workman during litigation but not to enhance his financial entitlement beyond the last drawn wages. By distinguishing between subsistence allowance and minimum wages, the Rajasthan High Court clarified the limits of judicial discretion and ensured that the statutory framework of the Industrial Disputes Act is interpreted strictly while still balancing the interests of both employers and employees.   Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

Rajasthan High Court Holds That Short Absence Is Not Desertion: CRPF Constable Reinstated

Rajasthan High Court Holds That Short Absence Is Not Desertion: CRPF Constable Reinstated The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, has delivered an important judgment clarifying the legal distinction between desertion and unauthorised absence in disciplined forces. In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7778/2006, the Court set aside the removal of a CRPF constable who had been wrongly treated as a deserter for a short period of absence. The judgment reaffirms that temporary absence, followed by voluntary rejoining of duty, does not amount to desertion under the CRPF Act, 1949  The petitioner was appointed as a Constable (GD) in the Central Reserve Police Force in 1995 and had a strong service record. During his tenure, he was repeatedly appreciated for his performance, including sensitive deployments during post-riot duties in Gujarat and rescue and relief operations during the Bhuj earthquake. Despite this, a charge-sheet was issued against him in 2002 alleging desertion from training, unauthorised stay outside the camp, misconduct during training, and habitual indiscipline. Based on these allegations, the disciplinary authority imposed the extreme penalty of removal from service, which was later upheld in appeal and revision. The core issue before the High Court was whether the petitioner’s absence for about twenty days, which was supported by medical evidence and followed by voluntary resumption of duty, could legally be treated as desertion. The Court examined the scheme of the CRPF Act, 1949, particularly Sections 9 and 10, and observed that the law makes a clear distinction between desertion and absence without leave. Desertion is classified as a more heinous offence and requires animus deserendi, meaning a deliberate and permanent intention to abandon service. Absence without leave, on the other hand, is a lesser offence and does not automatically become desertion. The Court noted that the charge-sheet itself admitted that the petitioner rejoined duty on his own within a short period. This admitted fact completely negated any intention to permanently abandon service. The Court held that once voluntary rejoining is established, the essential ingredient of desertion is missing, rendering the charge legally unsustainable. Branding such a short absence as desertion was held to be a clear case of non-application of mind. The High Court also found serious procedural lapses in the departmental enquiry. Despite repeated requests, the petitioner was not supplied with relied-upon documents, and he was denied an effective opportunity to examine defence witnesses. The Enquiry Officer ignored unimpeachable medical records showing that the petitioner was suffering from acute renal pain and had undergone hospital treatment during the relevant period. The illness of his wife was also supported by documentary evidence, yet these mitigating circumstances were brushed aside without reasons. Further, the allegation that the petitioner stayed outside the camp without permission was found to be completely false, as the respondents’ own records showed that written permission had been granted to him earlier. The charge relating to misconduct during training was also unsupported by evidence, as training records reflected good conduct and high performance. The Court observed that earlier minor punishments could not be used to label the petitioner as habitually indisciplined so as to justify removal from service. The High Court strongly criticised the appellate and revisional authorities for passing cryptic and non-speaking orders. It held that statutory remedies lose their purpose if authorities fail to apply independent mind and merely endorse earlier decisions mechanically. The punishment of removal from service was held to be shockingly disproportionate, especially when imposed on a constable with a proven record of dedication and gallantry, and where the alleged misconduct arose largely from medical exigencies. Ultimately, the Rajasthan High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the removal order along with all consequential appellate and revisional orders. The respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and seniority. However, the Court limited the relief to notional benefits and denied actual back wages for the intervening period. The entire exercise was directed to be completed within sixty days from receipt of the judgment. This judgment is significant for service jurisprudence in uniformed forces. It reinforces that every unauthorised absence is not desertion, that intention to permanently abandon service is the decisive factor, and that disciplinary authorities must strictly follow statutory safeguards. The ruling serves as a reminder that while discipline is vital, it cannot be enforced at the cost of fairness, proportionality, and the rule of law. Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal

JVVNL Forcing Plot Owners to buy electricity from builder is illegal : Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench

JVVNL Forcing Plot Owners to buy electricity from builder is illegal : Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench Janak Singh Hada Vs State of Rajasthan & Others and Connected Matters D.B. Civil Writ Petition Number 7445/2025 Date of Judgment : 07.01.2026 In a significant judgment protecting the rights of homeowners, the Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has granted relief to plot owners of Vatika Infotech City who were denied individual electricity connections for years. The case arose from a long-standing dispute where residents of a JDA-approved colony were forced to purchase electricity from private developer-linked companies instead of receiving direct domestic electricity connections from Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (JVVNL). The High Court’s order dated 07 January 2026 has clarified the legal position on single point electricity connections, private monopoly, and the statutory duty of distribution companies. Vatika Infotech City is a large residential township in Jaipur with more than 3,500 plots approved by the Jaipur Development Authority. Despite residents owning freehold plots and having constructed houses on their own land, JVVNL consistently refused to provide individual electricity connections. Instead, residents were compelled to buy electricity through sub-meters installed by private companies associated with the builder, which were operating without any licence under the Electricity Act, 2003. This practice continued for more than fifteen years, causing serious hardship to residents. Aggrieved plot owners, including Janak Singh Hada and other similarly placed residents, approached the Rajasthan High Court by filing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petition challenged Regulation 6.3 of the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Electricity Supply Code and Connected Matters) Regulations, 2021, alleging that it was being misused to justify an illegal monopoly of electricity distribution by non-licensee private companies. The petitioners also challenged the refusal letter dated 17.11.2023 by JVVNL, which directed residents to obtain electricity from the developer instead of granting direct connections. The petitioners argued that under Section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003, every distribution licensee has a statutory duty to supply electricity to an owner or occupier of premises upon application. They further contended that Regulation 6.3 itself contains a proviso that clearly protects the right of an individual consumer to demand direct electricity supply from the distribution licensee. Despite this, JVVNL continued to deny connections, citing reasons such as “single point connection” and “non-electrification of the colony,” while simultaneously allowing private companies to sell electricity within the same colony. After examining the pleadings, documents, and the connected writ petitions, the Rajasthan High Court made crucial observations. The Court held that JVVNL, being a distribution licensee under the Electricity Act, cannot shift its statutory responsibility onto a private developer. The Court found that Regulation 6.3 does not prohibit individual electricity connections and, in fact, mandates release of direct connections when demanded by eligible applicants. The practice of forcing residents to buy electricity from a builder through a single point connection was held to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and contrary to law. The High Court further recognised that electricity is an essential service and forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Denial of electricity to residents who have complied with all requirements and are willing to pay applicable charges was found to be a clear violation of constitutional and statutory rights. The Court rejected the argument that the colony was not electrified, observing that such a stand was neither fair nor justified when electricity was already being supplied through private intermediaries. By its final order, the Rajasthan High Court directed Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited to issue independent electricity connections to the petitioners after completion of necessary formalities and payment of applicable charges. The Court ordered that such connections must be released within a period of two months from the date of the order. While the challenge to the constitutional validity of Regulation 6.3 was kept open for consideration in an appropriate case, the Court granted substantial relief to the residents by enforcing their right to direct electricity supply. This judgment is extremely important for plot owners and residents living in private colonies across Rajasthan. It sends a clear message that developers cannot run parallel electricity distribution systems without a licence and that distribution companies cannot abdicate their statutory duties. The decision also curbs the practice of creating illegal monopolies over essential services like electricity and strengthens consumer rights in urban residential colonies. In conclusion, the Rajasthan High Court’s decision in the Vatika Infotech City electricity case reaffirms that electricity is not a privilege controlled by builders but a legal right guaranteed under law. Distribution licensees are bound to serve consumers directly, and regulatory provisions cannot be misused to deny citizens access to basic necessities. This judgment will serve as a strong precedent for similar disputes involving denial of electricity connections in developer-led townships across the state. Counsel for the Petitioners Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

BIFR Scheme Cannot Bind State Without Express Approval Under SICA, Rules Rajasthan High Court

BIFR Scheme Cannot Bind State Without Express Approval Under SICA, Rules Rajasthan High Court Lords Chloro Alkali Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 990/2018Judgment dated 19 December 2025 The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, has dismissed a writ petition filed by Lords Chloro Alkali Ltd., holding that a rehabilitation scheme sanctioned by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction cannot be enforced against the State Government in the absence of express consent as required under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The Court also found that prolonged non-compliance by the company itself disentitled it from any relief under writ jurisdiction. The petition arose from demand notices issued in 2017 by the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation for recovery of dues relating to an Interest Free Sales Tax Loan. The company contended that these demands violated a rehabilitation scheme sanctioned by BIFR in November 2006, under which the sales tax liability was settled at 26.58 per cent of the principal amount, payable in instalments without interest. On this basis, the company sought quashing of the demand notices and enforcement of the sanctioned scheme. Tracing the background, the Court noted that the company had been declared a sick industrial unit in 2002 and that a final rehabilitation scheme was approved in 2006 after circulation to various stakeholders. While the scheme contemplated substantial concessions, including in respect of sales tax dues, the State Government and its nodal agency, RIICO, disputed that any binding consent had ever been granted for such concessions. The High Court examined whether the scheme could bind the State in the absence of express consent under Section 19(2) of SICA. It found that no document or record showed affirmative approval by the competent authority of the State Government for waiver or reduction of sales tax liabilities. The order of BIFR itself recorded that RIICO had only stated that the proposal was under consideration and that settlements below the principal amount were generally not accepted, which, according to the Court, could not be treated as consent. Rejecting the argument of deemed consent, the Court held that internal correspondence, file notings, or prolonged silence cannot substitute the statutory requirement of express consent when public revenue is involved. Relying on settled judicial precedents, the Court reiterated that BIFR has no power to compel a State Government to grant fiscal concessions without such consent, and that schemes lacking this requirement are unenforceable against the State. The Court also took serious note of the petitioner’s conduct. It observed that despite the scheme prescribing a clear repayment schedule from 2006 onwards, the company had failed to make any payment for nearly eleven years and deposited an amount only in 2017. This prolonged non-compliance, the Court held, amounted to a fundamental breach of the scheme and eroded any equitable basis for invoking writ jurisdiction. On the issue of repeal of SICA, the Court acknowledged that repeal does not automatically nullify sanctioned schemes. However, it clarified that only legally binding components of a scheme survive repeal, and a provision that was never enforceable against the State for want of consent cannot be revived later. Applying the doctrine of laches, the High Court held that the petitioner’s delay and inaction were fatal to its claim. It observed that discretionary relief under Article 226 cannot be granted to a party that has failed to perform its own obligations and approaches the Court after an inordinate lapse of time. For these reasons, the Jaipur Bench concluded that the writ petition lacked merit and dismissed it, thereby upholding the demand notices issued by RIICO and reinforcing the principle that State consent is mandatory before any rehabilitation scheme can impose financial concessions affecting public revenue.  

Rajasthan High Court Rejects Third Bail Plea of Police Constable in Bharatpur Murder Case, Relies on Call Records Showing Criminal Conspiracy

Rajasthan High Court Rejects Third Bail Plea of Police Constable in Bharatpur Murder Case, Relies on Call Records Showing Criminal Conspiracy Case Title: Ravindra Singh S/o Rambharosi v. State of RajasthanCourt: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at JaipurCitation: S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous III Bail Application No. 10667/2025Date of Judgment: December, 2025 The present judgment arises from the third bail application moved by the accused-petitioner Ravindra Singh under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. The petitioner was arrested in connection with FIR No. 218/2023 registered at Police Station Halena, District Bharatpur, for serious offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The matter was heard and decided by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Praveer Bhatnagar, with the Court delivering a reasoned and complete judgment declining bail. The petitioner contended that he had been falsely implicated in the case and that no direct or substantive evidence existed to establish his role in the alleged conspiracy leading to the murder of Kuldeep Singh and the grievous injuries caused to Vijaypal. It was argued that his earlier bail application had been rejected with liberty to renew the prayer after recording the statement of the injured witness, and that subsequent developments, including material witnesses turning hostile, justified reconsideration. Emphasis was also placed on the petitioner’s long incarceration and his status as a police constable. The State and the complainant strongly opposed the bail plea, drawing the Court’s attention to the background of the case and the alleged motive. It was argued that the petitioner is the real brother of Kripal Singh, whose murder had preceded the present incident, and that the killing of Kuldeep Singh was an act of revenge carried out pursuant to a criminal conspiracy. The prosecution relied heavily on call detail records collected during investigation, which indicated sustained and repeated contact between the petitioner and the principal assailants before and after the incident. It was further pointed out that the bail application of a similarly placed co-accused, Aaditya, had already been dismissed by the High Court, and that the petitioner’s case stood on identical footing. Upon a careful perusal of the material on record, the High Court examined the call detail analysis placed by the investigating agency. The judgment records that the petitioner had made and received a significant number of calls with key co-accused over an extended period, clearly suggesting continuous communication. The Court took note of the fact that these call records formed part of an elaborate investigation and prima facie supported the prosecution’s allegation of conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC. The Court found that such evidence could not be lightly brushed aside at the stage of considering bail, particularly in a case involving allegations of murder motivated by revenge. The High Court also placed weight on the principle of parity, observing that the case of the petitioner was not distinguishable from that of the co-accused whose bail had already been rejected. The Court held that, in the absence of any new or exceptional circumstance, there was no justification to take a different view in the petitioner’s third bail application. The seriousness of the offence, the nature of allegations, and the prima facie material indicating a conspiratorial role weighed decisively against the grant of bail. Concluding its analysis, the Court held that, at the present stage, it was not inclined to enlarge the accused-petitioner on bail. Accordingly, the third bail application was dismissed. The judgment underscores the Rajasthan High Court’s consistent approach that in cases involving grave offences like murder coupled with conspiracy, sustained call-based linkage between accused persons can constitute strong prima facie material sufficient to deny bail, especially when earlier bail pleas have already been rejected on merits. Read complete order here

High Court Upholds Acquittal Where Evidence Is Conflicting — Jaipur Bench Confirms Trial Court Finding

High Court Upholds Acquittal Where Evidence Is Conflicting — Jaipur Bench Confirms Trial Court Finding Case Title: State of Rajasthan v. Ramkesh & Mukesh — D.B. Criminal Leave to Appeal No. 146/2024.Date of Judgment: 11 December 2025. The facts of the case, as recorded by the trial court, relate to an incident on 20 September 2014 near a water tank at Lavana in which the deceased, Krishna Kumar, allegedly suffered injuries after an altercation and a subsequent vehicle impact. The prosecution case, set out in the police report and charge sheet, accused the respondents of causing grievous injuries and of an overt act of running the deceased down by hitting him with a Bolero vehicle (bearing registration ARJ-14-Y-5017) and assault by companions, allegations which ultimately led to investigation under sections 323, 307 and 302/34 IPC. The trial court framed and examined charges and, after trial, recorded an order of acquittal on 29 March 2023. The trial court’s judgment, as reproduced in the record, proceeded from an analysis of the ocular testimony, documentary material and medical reports relied upon by prosecution and defence. The court found divergences in the statements of prosecution witnesses, delays and discrepancies in reporting the incident to police, and material differences between various eyewitness accounts about the sequence of events, the role of the accused, and whether the vehicle impact as alleged was a deliberate act. The trial court also examined medical evidence and the injury pattern, and considered whether those materials compelled the conclusion of homicidal intent or guilty participation beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal by the State through a petition for leave, the High Court undertook a re-appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence within the narrow compass permitted on appeals against acquittal. The Bench reviewed witness depositions, the medical record and attendant circumstances, noting contradictions in key witnesses’ versions about timing, the nature of blows, presence and role of the accused at the spot, and the sequence between an altercation and the vehicle event. The Court observed that several prosecution witnesses gave differing accounts regarding whether the deceased was assaulted first, whether the Bolero struck the deceased intentionally, and whether the accused were driving the vehicle that allegedly caused the injuries. The High Court also engaged with the medical evidence and the contents of injury reports; while injuries and hospital records were on the file, the Bench recorded that the medical report did not, by itself, conclusively establish the prosecution’s pleaded narrative of deliberate homicide by vehicle impact. The Court further noted the trial court’s legitimate evaluation of delays in lodging the report, discrepancies about immediate police attendance, and the absence of convincing contemporaneous corroboration that linked the accused to the fatal result in a manner that excluded all reasonable doubt. In applying principles governing appellate interference with acquittal orders, the Bench relied upon the well-settled tests reflected in recent precedents, including the requirement that an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal unless the trial court’s view is perverse, based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where no two reasonable views are possible and the only possible conclusion on the record is guilt. On re-appreciation, the High Court found that the trial court’s view was a possible view legitimately open on the evidence and that there was no patent perversity or omission warranting reversal. Concluding its examination, the Jaipur Bench held that the trial court’s acquittal suffered from no legal or factual infirmity sufficient to grant the State leave to appeal. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused and the order of acquittal dated 29 March 2023 was affirmed; a copy of this decision was directed to be sent to the trial court for information. Read complete order here By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal