Category: Criminal

How to Oppose Quashing of FIR in High Court

How to Oppose Quashing of FIR in High Court When an accused files a petition for quashing of FIR before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS, the complainant and prosecution have a strong legal right to oppose the quashing petition. Many victims believe that once a quashing petition is filed, the FIR will automatically be cancelled. However, the law is clear that quashing of FIR is an exceptional remedy and the High Court must exercise this power very cautiously. Understanding how to oppose quashing of FIR is extremely important for complainants, victims, lawyers, and investigating agencies. A properly drafted reply and strong legal arguments can prevent the accused from getting relief. In this detailed guide, we explain how to oppose quashing of FIR, the best legal grounds, important Supreme Court judgments, practical courtroom strategy, and mistakes to avoid. What is Quashing of FIR? Quashing of FIR means cancellation of a criminal case by the High Court by using its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS. The accused usually files a quashing petition claiming that the FIR is false, malicious, civil in nature, settled between parties, or does not disclose any offence. The High Court can interfere only in rare situations where continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law. The Supreme Court in the landmark case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal laid down strict principles regarding quashing of FIR. How to Oppose Quashing of FIR Effectively A complainant must understand that opposing a quashing petition requires both factual and legal preparation. Merely denying allegations is not enough. The complainant must show that the FIR discloses a prima facie offence and investigation or trial should continue. Below are the most effective methods regarding how to oppose quashing of FIR. Show Prima Facie Offence in the FIR The strongest way to oppose quashing of FIR is to show that the FIR clearly discloses commission of a cognizable offence. The High Court generally does not conduct a mini trial while deciding a quashing petition. If allegations prima facie disclose ingredients of an offence, the FIR quashing in High Court should normally be rejected. The complainant should specifically point out: Exact allegations in the FIR Role of each accused Supporting documents Witness statements Medical evidence Electronic evidence Circumstantial evidence The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that disputed questions of fact cannot be examined in Section 482 CrPC proceedings. Argue That Investigation is Still Pending Another important method regarding how to oppose quashing of FIR is to argue that investigation is incomplete. If investigation is at an early stage, courts are generally reluctant to interfere unless the case falls within exceptional categories. The complainant should argue that: Police is collecting evidence Statements are yet to be recorded Electronic evidence is under examination Recovery proceedings are pending Forensic reports are awaited Courts have repeatedly observed that premature interference in investigation should be avoided. Oppose Quashing Petition by Showing Disputed Facts One of the best arguments against a quashing petition is that the accused is raising disputed questions of fact. Under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court does not decide: Reliability of witnesses Truthfulness of allegations Admissibility of evidence Contradictions in statements Defence of accused These issues are decided only during trial. Therefore, while opposing quashing of FIR, the complainant should argue that the accused is trying to convert Section 482 CrPC proceedings into a full-fledged trial. Section 482 CrPC and Limited Scope of High Court Section 482 CrPC gives inherent powers to the High Court to prevent abuse of process and secure ends of justice. However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that Section 482 CrPC powers must be exercised sparingly and with great caution. The Court cannot conduct appreciation of evidence while deciding FIR quashing in High Court. Important principles under Section 482 CrPC include: High Court should not act as a trial court Defence of accused cannot ordinarily be considered Allegations in FIR must be presumed true at initial stage Criminal proceedings should continue if offence is disclosed Detailed examination of evidence is not permissible These principles are extremely important while opposing quashing of FIR. Important Supreme Court Judgments on Quashing of FIR State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal This is the leading judgment regarding quashing of FIR. The Supreme Court held that quashing powers should be exercised only in rare cases. If allegations disclose commission of an offence, criminal proceedings should continue. The judgment also laid down limited categories where FIR quashing in High Court may be allowed. Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra The Supreme Court held that courts should not interfere in criminal investigation at the initial stage. The Court specifically observed that: Police has statutory right to investigate Courts should not stay investigation routinely Quashing petition should be decided cautiously FIR should be read as a whole This judgment is extremely useful while opposing quashing of FIR. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan The Supreme Court held that serious offences affecting society should not be quashed merely because parties have settled disputes. This judgment is important in: Serious assault cases Economic offences Cases involving public interest Offences against society Heinous offences Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander The Supreme Court held that courts should not examine sufficiency of evidence while deciding a quashing petition. The Court further held that if allegations disclose ingredients of offence, proceedings should continue. Best Grounds to Oppose Quashing Petition FIR Clearly Discloses Offence The complainant must show that all ingredients of the offence are clearly mentioned. This is one of the strongest grounds to oppose quashing petition. Serious Nature of Allegations If allegations involve: Violence Fraud Cheating Forgery Sexual offences SC/ST offences Economic offences Public interest then FIR quashing in High Court should not ordinarily be allowed. Evidence Requires Trial The complainant should argue that evidence must be tested during trial through: Cross examination Documentary proof Expert reports Witness testimony The High Court cannot appreciate evidence under Section 482

Jaipur High Court on Power of High Court Under Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS to Summon Material Witness

Jaipur High Court on Power of High Court Under Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS to Summon Material Witness In an important ruling concerning the power of High Court under Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS, the Jaipur High Court reaffirmed that criminal courts possess wide authority to summon any material witness, recall witnesses already examined, or examine any person present before the court whenever such evidence is necessary for a just decision. The judgment was delivered in Shankar & Anr. Vs State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 6180/2021, decided on 18/04/2026 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand. Case Title, Number and Date of Judgment Case Title: Shankar & Another Vs State of RajasthanCase Number: S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 6180/2021Court: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at JaipurDate of Judgment: 18 April 2026 Facts Considered by Jaipur High Court The accused persons were facing trial for offences under Sections 376, 363 and 366 IPC along with provisions of the POCSO Act. During trial, statements of the prosecutrix and her mother had already been recorded. Later, a changed circumstance arose when the prosecutrix married one of the accused, namely Shankar, and from the marriage a daughter was born. Thereafter, the accused moved an application seeking recall of the prosecutrix and her mother for fresh examination in view of subsequent events. The trial court rejected the application on 06.09.2021, which was challenged before the Jaipur High Court. Power to Summon Material Witness or Examine Person Present The Jaipur High Court held that the object of Section 311 CrPC is to enable the court to discover truth and render a just decision after bringing all relevant facts on record. The Court observed that this power must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. It further clarified that the provision cannot be used merely to fill lacunae in prosecution or defence, but can certainly be invoked where fresh evidence is necessary in the interest of justice. Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS: Court may summon, recall, or re-examine witnesses in the interest of justicetext{Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS: Court may summon, recall, or re-examine witnesses in the interest of justice}Section 311 CrPC / Section 348 BNSS: Court may summon, recall, or re-examine witnesses in the interest of justice The High Court specifically noted that since the trial was still pending, recalling the prosecutrix and her mother would not prejudice the prosecution. Rather, their further statements could assist the court in properly adjudicating the matter after considering changed circumstances. Jaipur High Court Set Aside Trial Court Order Allowing the petition, the Jaipur High Court quashed the order dated 06.09.2021 and directed the trial court to summon PW-1 and PW-2 again, record their evidence, and thereafter decide the case strictly in accordance with law. This judgment is a significant precedent on the power to summon material witness, or examine person present, showing that courts can revisit evidence where justice so requires. Legal Significance Under BNSS After replacement of CrPC by BNSS, the corresponding provision is Section 348 BNSS. Therefore, the principle laid down by the Jaipur High Court remains highly relevant even today. Courts continue to retain authority to summon any witness, recall witnesses already examined, and secure the best available evidence for a fair trial.   Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur

Legal Heirs Can Continue Criminal Appeal After Death of Victim: Jaipur High Court Clarifies Law

Legal Heirs Can Continue Criminal Appeal After Death of Victim: Rajasthan High Court Clarifies Law The Rajasthan High Court has recently delivered a significant judgment that strengthens the rights of victims and their families in criminal proceedings. The Court clearly held that legal heirs of a deceased victim can continue a criminal appeal against acquittal, even after the death of the original complainant. This decision brings much-needed clarity to an area where there was confusion due to gaps in the law. In the case before the Court, the original complainant had filed a criminal case alleging fraud, forgery, and conspiracy related to land mutation. After trial, the accused were acquitted, and the complainant filed an appeal. However, during the pendency of the appeal, the complainant passed away. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as “abated” due to her death. The legal heirs then approached the High Court challenging this decision. The central issue before the Court was whether legal heirs of a deceased victim can continue an appeal filed against acquittal. The Court examined the definition of “victim” under Section 2(wa) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which clearly includes legal heirs and guardians. Based on this, the Court held that legal heirs step into the shoes of the victim and therefore have the right to continue legal proceedings. Further, the Court relied on the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which gives victims the right to appeal against acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or inadequate compensation. The Court interpreted this provision in a liberal and progressive manner, emphasizing that the term “victim” should not be restricted and must include legal representatives. One of the key legal conflicts in this case was with Section 394 CrPC, which deals with abatement of appeals on the death of the appellant. Traditionally, this section allows continuation of appeals only when the accused dies, permitting their relatives to pursue the appeal. However, it does not explicitly provide the same right to the legal heirs of a victim. The High Court resolved this conflict by adopting a purposive interpretation of the law. It held that the absence of explicit provision in Section 394 CrPC should not defeat the substantive rights granted to victims under Section 372. The Court also relied on recent Supreme Court judgments which have recognized the rights of victims and their heirs to continue appeals and prosecution. Importantly, the Court observed that denying such a right to victims’ families would create inequality and may violate Article 14 of the Constitution. While relatives of an accused can continue appeals to protect their honour, denying the same right to victims’ families would be unjust. Based on this reasoning, the High Court set aside the order of abatement and restored the appeal. It allowed the legal heirs to file an application seeking permission to continue the appeal, which the lower court must decide on merits. The Court also made an important recommendation to the legislature, highlighting that Section 394 CrPC should be amended to explicitly allow legal heirs of victims to continue appeals after death. This observation shows a progressive approach towards victim rights in the criminal justice system. In conclusion, this judgment is a landmark step in strengthening victim-centric justice in India. It ensures that legal proceedings do not end abruptly due to the death of a victim and that their family members can continue the fight for justice. This ruling will have a wide impact on criminal appeals, especially in cases involving acquittal, and provides a clear legal pathway for legal heirs to pursue justice.  Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur

Rajasthan High Court: Plea of Alibi Not Considerable at Section 319 CrPC Stage

Rajasthan High Court Plea of Alibi Not Considerable at Section 319 CrPC Stage The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 3521/2019, through reportable order dated 25.03.2026, upheld the Trial Court’s order summoning the petitioners under Section 319 CrPC in a murder case. The petitioners argued that they were not present at the place of occurrence and relied on a CID (CB) investigation supporting their plea of alibi. However, the Court held that the plea of alibi is a matter of defence and cannot be considered at the stage of taking cognizance. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court clarified that under Section 319 CrPC, an accused can be summoned if evidence indicates involvement, even if not charge-sheeted. Since the FIR and witness statements clearly named the petitioners, the Court found sufficient material to proceed and dismissed the petition. Prelude: Supreme Court Directions and Background of the Case The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 3521/2019, dealt with an important issue concerning the scope of Section 319 CrPC and the plea of alibi. The matter came up before the Court pursuant to directions issued by the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar & Ors. vs State of Rajasthan, wherein High Courts were directed to prioritise long-pending criminal matters, especially where interim orders had stalled trials involving serious offences like murder and rape. In compliance with these directions, the High Court took up the present petition, which challenged an order passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ajmer, allowing an application under Section 319 CrPC and summoning the petitioners as additional accused. Challenge to Section 319 CrPC Cognizance Order The petitioners challenged the order dated 15.01.2019 whereby the Trial Court had taken cognizance against them under various IPC provisions including Sections 147, 148, 302, 307, and 120B. The case arose from an incident dated 10.11.2016, followed by an FIR lodged the next day by the wife of the deceased, wherein the petitioners were named along with other accused persons. However, during investigation, the CID (CB) found that the petitioners were not present at the place of occurrence. One petitioner was stated to be 5 km away, while the other was in Pushkar, approximately 15 km away. Based on this, an application under Section 169 CrPC was filed, and the Magistrate ordered their release. Despite this, during trial, based on the statement of PW-4 (wife of the deceased), the Trial Court exercised its powers under Section 319 CrPC and summoned the petitioners. Arguments of Parties: Alibi vs Evidentiary Threshold The petitioners high court lawyer in jaipur argued that the Trial Court failed to consider the CID (CB) investigation which supported their plea of alibi. They relied on Supreme Court judgments such as Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Jogendra Yadav v. State of Bihar, contending that more than a prima facie case is required under Section 319 CrPC and that relevant investigative material must be considered. On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor and the complainant argued that the FIR and statements under Section 161 CrPC clearly named the petitioners with specific overt acts. They contended that at the stage of cognizance, the Court is not required to evaluate the defence or test the credibility of evidence. Reliance was placed on Sandeep Kumar v. State of Haryana and Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, emphasizing that courts have the power to summon additional accused if evidence indicates their involvement. Court’s Analysis: Scope of Section 319 CrPC and Plea of Alibi The High Court undertook a detailed analysis of Section 319 CrPC and reiterated that the provision empowers the Court to summon any person who appears, from the evidence, to have committed an offence, even if not charge-sheeted by the police. A crucial issue before the Court was whether the plea of alibi could be considered at the stage of taking cognizance. The Court categorically held that alibi is a defence that must be proved during trial and cannot be examined at the stage of summoning under Section 319 CrPC. It relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2025), which clarified that unproven defence material cannot override prosecution evidence at the threshold stage. The Court further observed that the standard under Section 319 CrPC is higher than a mere prima facie case but does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. If evidence such as eyewitness testimony indicates involvement, the Court is justified in summoning the accused. Conclusion: Petition Dismissed, Alibi to Be Tested at Trial Stage The Rajasthan High Court concluded that there was sufficient material on record, including FIR and witness statements, to justify summoning the petitioners under Section 319 CrPC. It held that the defence of alibi cannot be considered at this stage and must be tested during trial. Accordingly, the criminal miscellaneous petition was dismissed, and the order of the Trial Court was upheld. However, considering that the petitioners had earlier been released under Section 169 CrPC, the Court granted relief by directing that petitioner No. 2 shall not be arrested if he appears before the Trial Court and furnishes bail bonds. The Court also clarified that its observations are limited to the adjudication under Section 319 CrPC and shall not affect the final appreciation of evidence during trial.

Rajasthan HC: Recovery Alone Not Enough in Bribery Case

Rajasthan High Court Acquits Patwari in Bribery Case : Mere Recovery Not Enough Without Proof of Demand (2026 Judgment) In a significant judgment dated 19 March 2026, the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) acquitted a Patwari who had earlier been convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court clearly held that mere recovery of money is not enough to prove a bribery offence unless the prosecution is able to establish both demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt. The case, Mohan Lal Gupta vs State of Rajasthan, arose from allegations that the accused Patwari demanded ₹1,000 from the complainant for entering certain land records. Based on the complaint, the Anti-Corruption Bureau arranged a trap and claimed to have recovered the bribe amount from the accused. The trial court relied on this recovery and convicted the accused under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, awarding imprisonment and fine. However, before the High Court, the accused strongly challenged the conviction. It was argued that he was not responsible for the work related to the complainant’s land and that the relevant work had already been completed earlier. The defence also pointed out that the complainant did not fully support the prosecution’s version, and there were multiple contradictions in the statements of witnesses. It was further contended that the alleged recovery of money was not properly linked to any illegal demand or acceptance. While examining the case, the High Court focused on the core legal requirement in corruption cases — proof of demand and acceptance of bribe. The Court reiterated that demand of illegal gratification is the foundation of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Without clear and reliable evidence of demand, a conviction cannot be sustained. The Court also emphasized that even if money is recovered from the accused, it must be shown that the accused knowingly accepted it as a bribe. Relying on settled law laid down by the Supreme Court, the High Court held that mere recovery of currency notes does not automatically establish guilt. The prosecution must prove a complete chain of events, starting from demand, followed by acceptance, and then recovery. If the initial demand itself is doubtful or not proved, the entire case collapses. In this case, the Court found serious deficiencies in the prosecution’s evidence. There was no clear and convincing proof that the accused had demanded any bribe. The complainant’s testimony did not fully support the prosecution, and independent evidence was lacking. Additionally, there were inconsistencies in witness statements and doubts regarding the recovery process. The Court also noted that the work for which the bribe was allegedly demanded had already been completed, which further weakened the prosecution’s case. Considering all these factors, the High Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the benefit of doubt was given to the accused, and the conviction passed by the trial court was set aside. The accused was accordingly acquitted of all charges. This judgment is highly important from a legal perspective as it reinforces a fundamental principle of criminal law — that no person can be convicted without strict proof of guilt. In corruption cases, courts require clear evidence of demand and acceptance of bribe, and mere recovery of money is not sufficient. The decision also highlights the importance of independent and reliable evidence, especially in trap cases conducted by anti-corruption agencies. In conclusion, the Rajasthan High Court has once again clarified that in bribery cases, “no demand means no conviction.” This ruling will serve as a strong precedent for similar cases and will be particularly useful for defence in corruption matters where the prosecution relies solely on recovery without proving the basic ingredients of the offence. Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur

Rajasthan High Court Upholds Acquittal in Murder Case Due to Contradictory Circumstantial Evidence and Unexplained FIR Delay

Rajasthan High Court Upholds Acquittal in Murder Case Due to Contradictory Circumstantial Evidence and Unexplained FIR Delay State of Rajasthan v. Sampat & Anr., D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 363/2002, decided on 25 February 2026 (Raj HC, Jaipur Bench), reported in 2026:RJ-JP:8788-DB, per Mahendar Kumar Goyal & Sameer Jain, JJ. (Connected with: Kalyan Ram v. Sampat Singh & Anr., D.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 674/2001) The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 363/2002 and connected Criminal Revision Petition No. 674/2001, delivered its judgment on 25.02.2026, dismissing both the appeal filed by the State and the revision petition filed by the complainant. The case arose from Sessions Case No. 23/1999 decided by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kishangarh, District Ajmer, wherein the accused persons were acquitted of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution case was based on a written report dated 05.03.1999 submitted by Kalyan Ram, on the basis of which FIR No. 31/1999 was registered at Police Station Rupangarh, District Ajmer, for offences under Sections 302 and 34 IPC. It was alleged that the accused had committed the murder of Rupa Ram. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed and charges were framed. However, after trial, the learned trial court acquitted the accused, leading to the present appeal and revision before the High Court. Before the High Court, the State and the complainant argued that the trial court had failed to properly appreciate the circumstantial evidence and that the chain of circumstances clearly established the guilt of the accused. It was submitted that the postmortem report showed an ante-mortem head injury and that a lathi was recovered on the disclosure statement of one of the accused. It was also contended that the delay in lodging the FIR was not fatal to the prosecution case. On the other hand, the counsel for the accused supported the acquittal and argued that the prosecution evidence was contradictory and unreliable. The High Court carefully examined the evidence on record and noted that the case was entirely based on circumstantial evidence. It found material contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, particularly regarding what the deceased allegedly told them about the incident and who was responsible. The Court also observed that although the family members claimed to have known about the incident on the same night, the FIR was lodged after a delay of two days by a person who was neither a close family member nor a resident of the same village. No satisfactory explanation for this delay was provided. Further, the medical evidence did not fully support the prosecution version, as only a swelling on the skull was found and there were inconsistencies regarding the alleged dragging of the deceased. Importantly, the medical evidence suggested the possibility that the deceased might have suffered the fatal injury due to a fall, especially as there was evidence indicating consumption of alcohol. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the fatal injury was caused by the accused. In view of these findings, the High Court concluded that the trial court’s judgment of acquittal did not suffer from any perversity, illegality, or infirmity warranting interference in appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly, both the criminal appeal and the revision petition were dismissed, and the acquittal of the accused was upheld.   By Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

Rajasthan HC Rejects Sentence Suspension in POCSO Appeal Case

Rajasthan HC Rejects Sentence Suspension in POCSO Appeal Case Date of Order: 13.02.2026   The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, recently dealt with a significant suspension of sentence application filed by an accused convicted under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. The case arose from D.B. Criminal Misc. Suspension of Sentence Application No. 2047/2024, filed along with a criminal appeal by the accused Vishnu @ Vikram, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment by the Special Court, POCSO Act, Dausa. The conviction was primarily under Sections 5(l)(m)/6 of the POCSO Act, along with alternative provisions of the Indian Penal Code, for serious allegations involving a minor victim.  The applicant approached the High Court seeking suspension of sentence during the pendency of the appeal. The defence argued that the trial court had wrongly treated the victim as being below eleven years of age without sufficient evidence, and further contended that the allegations of rape were not medically corroborated. It was also submitted that there existed prior enmity between the parties, which allegedly resulted in false implication. On these grounds, the counsel requested the Court to grant relief and suspend the sentence until the appeal was decided.  The State strongly opposed the plea, emphasizing the seriousness of the offence and the material evidence available on record. Upon hearing both sides, the Division Bench carefully examined the trial court judgment dated 20.03.2024. The Court noted that the victim’s age had been determined based on the birth certificate (Exhibit P-16), which showed that she was below eleven years at the time of the offence. Further, the victim’s testimony as PW-2 contained specific allegations of repeated sexual assault. Importantly, forensic evidence played a crucial role, as the DNA profile obtained from semen found on the victim’s clothing matched with the DNA sample of the accused, strengthening the prosecution’s case.  Considering the gravity of the accusations, the age of the victim, and the supporting forensic material, the High Court held that this was not a fit case for granting suspension of sentence. The Bench observed that the nature of evidence and seriousness of the offence weighed against the applicant. Consequently, the application for suspension of sentence was dismissed, and the accused was directed to continue serving the sentence awarded by the trial court.  This order highlights the cautious approach adopted by courts in cases involving offences against children, especially where strong testimonial and scientific evidence is available. It reiterates that suspension of sentence in serious POCSO convictions is not granted as a matter of routine and depends heavily on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and the overall circumstances of the case.

Claim of Maintenance by a Divorced Wife

Claim of maintenance by a divorced wife A divorced wife has a statutory right to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Every divorced wife, if otherwise eligible and unable to maintain herself, is entitled to the benefit of maintenance allowance. Divorce by itself does not extinguish the right of maintenance, and the obligation of the husband continues unless specifically discharged in accordance with law. Where the husband fails to prove that he was actually paying maintenance to the divorced wife, and merely contends that she forfeited her right due to divorce or an earlier consent decree, the essential condition of “neglect or refusal to maintain” stands satisfied. In such circumstances, a divorced wife is not required to plead or prove that she was not living separately by mutual consent. This principle has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli (1979 Cr LJ 151 SC) and reaffirmed by the Kerala High Court in Kamalakshi v. Sankaran (AIR 1979 Ker 116). Under Section 127(3)(b) of the CrPC, a husband can seek absolution from his obligation under Section 125 towards a divorced wife only on proof that he has paid a sum in accordance with customary or personal law, and that such sum is reasonably sufficient to substitute the maintenance allowance. Mere assertion of divorce or settlement is not enough. This legal position was authoritatively settled in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli (1979 Cr LJ 151 SC) and followed in Kamalakshi v. Sankaran (AIR 1979 Ker 116). The right of a divorced wife to receive maintenance flows directly from her status as a divorced wife. This right does not depend upon any further condition once divorce is established and inability to maintain herself is shown, as held in M. Nanu v. Vasantha (1986 Cr LJ 652). After divorce, the husband cannot insist that the wife should live with him, and consequently, the divorced wife is under no obligation to prove sufficient cause for living separately. This principle has been upheld in Velukutti v. Prasanna Kumar (1985 Cr LJ 1558 Ker) and Hari Singh v. Gulab Devi II (1989) DMC 439 (Raj). Even where the marriage has been dissolved by mutual consent, the divorced wife, if unable to maintain herself, is entitled to claim maintenance until she remarries. This position was clearly recognized in Sadasivam Pillai v. Vijaya Lakshmi (1989 Cr LJ 765). It is now a well-settled proposition of law that even where there is a valid decree of divorce, the wife remains entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. A decree of divorce cannot be used as a ground to deny maintenance, as held in Chandrakant v. Sulochana (1997 Cr LJ 520 Bom). Further, even when a decree of divorce is passed against the wife on the ground of desertion, she is not barred from claiming maintenance against her former husband from the date of the decree. This legal position has been affirmed in Jashelal v. Pushpabati (1998 Cr LJ 4740) and Harish v. Kabita Bai (2007 Cr LJ (NOC) 724 MP). Similarly, where a decree for restitution of conjugal rights had been passed prior to divorce, such decree loses all relevance once the marriage stands dissolved. After divorce, the earlier decree for restitution of conjugal rights ceases to have any legal significance, and the divorced wife cannot be denied maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. This principle was upheld in Koli Gomiben Shyamji v. Koli Laxman Premji (1998 Cr LJ 429 Guj). The Supreme Court has categorically held that a woman, after divorce, is entitled to claim maintenance from her former husband if she is unable to maintain herself and so long as she does not remarry. The ex-husband continues to remain under a statutory duty and legal obligation to provide maintenance to his divorced wife. This authoritative declaration of law is found in Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri (AIR 2000 SC 952). The fact that at the time of an initial compromise the wife did not claim maintenance, or that she did not seek maintenance at the disposal of the matrimonial suit, does not bar her from claiming maintenance at a subsequent stage. Any agreement or understanding whereby a wife relinquishes her right to future maintenance has no legal sanction, being opposed to public policy. This position has been reiterated in Bishnupriya Bhuniya v. Jhumi Banik (AIR 2007 NOC 657 Gau). By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

Alimony in Hindu Marriage Act & Section 141 BNSS Maintenance

Alimony under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (Now Section 141 BNSS) Even where alimony pendente lite is granted by the civil court in matrimonial proceeding under s. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act in favour of the wife alone, the Magistrate under s. 125, CrPC/141 BNSS can grant higher maintenance for wife and children (Ramesh Chandra v Veena Kaushal 1979 Cr LJ 3 (SC)).  However, the quantum of maintenance awarded under s. 125, CrPC /141 BNSS is adjustable with the award of alimony pendente lite granted by the Matrimonial Court (Sudip Chaudhary v Radha Chowdhury 1999 Cr LJ 466 (SC). When the plea of adjustment was not raised then the maintenance ordered under s. 125, CrPC/141 BNSS and alimony pendente lite ordered under s. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act are payable to the wife and both the orders are required to be complied with till the final decision is rendered by the civil court. After the civil court passes the final order of alimony, the husband can apply for cancellation or variation of the order passed under s. 125, CrPC/141 BNSS (T.Rajinder Singh v Maya Devi 1996 Cr LJ 2384 (AP). Only because a proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 is pending, an application under s. 125, CrPC/141 BNSS cannot be dismissed summarily (Balan v Pankojakhy 1992 Ker LJ 778). Even refusal of granting pendente lite maintenance by the civil court is not binding on the criminal court and the Magistrate can grant maintenance under s. 125, CrPC/141 BNSS in spite of such refusal (Ashok Nath Singh v Upasama Panwar 1994 Cr LJ 998 (H.P).  In case of dismissal of husband’s petition under any one of the ss. 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, alimony under the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be granted. But the wife can maintain a petition under s. 125, CrPC (Now 141 BNSS) – Chand Dhawan v Jawaharlal Dhawan (1993)3 SCC 406; 1993 Cr LJ 2930 Petition for nullity of marriage pending Even if a petition for nullity of marriage is pending under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, this will be no ground for refusal of maintenance to the wife under s. 125, CrPC, but in such petition for nullity of marriage, no interim direction has been given Manoj v M. Sindhi 2007 Cr LJ (NOC) 2 (Ker). Civil Court’s decree is binding on Criminal Court The question arose that if the husband obtained a decree for divorce on the ground of desertion by the wife, the petition under s. 125, CrPC cannot be dismissed summarily. The Magistrate has to scrutinize the judgment of the civil court to ascertain as to whether there was really any finding recorded by the civil court or not that the wife was guilty of desertion. However, the civil court decree is binding on the criminal court (Jasholal Agarwal v Pushupati 1994 Cr LJ 185 (Ori). Decree for restitution of conjugal rights However, despite the decree for restitution of conjugal rights passed against the wife, the wife may file an application under s. 125, CrPC unless it is proved that the person, in whose favour the decree was passed, was willing to discharge the obligation as a husband and has not secured the decree in order to frustrate the order of maintenance under s. 125, CrPC (K. NArayan Rao v Bhagyalakshmi 1984 Cr LJ 276 (Kant); Mr Shakal v Shahina Parveen (1987)1 Crima 115 (Del). When, in spite of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the wife refused to stay with the husband and the husband obtained a decree for divorce on the ground of desertion, the wife is not entitled to apply for maintenance under s. 125, CrPC (In the matter of Rabindra Nath Ray 1995 Cr LJ 1187 (Cal.) By Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

Corruption Conviction Quashed as Jaipur High Court Finds No Proof of Bribe Demand or Recovery

Corruption Conviction Quashed as Jaipur High Court Finds No Proof of Bribe Demand or Recovery In a detailed and reasoned judgment, the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur, while deciding S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 1498/2023, examined the legality of the conviction recorded by the Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act Cases, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, against three officials of the Railway Protection Force. The appeal arose out of a judgment dated 29.05.2023 whereby the appellants were convicted under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, along with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to one year’s rigorous imprisonment with fine. The prosecution case was founded on allegations that the appellants demanded and accepted a bribe of ₹5,000 for deleting the complainant’s name from a criminal case registered under the Railways Act. According to the complaint, an initial amount of ₹2,000 was allegedly paid, and a trap was later laid for the remaining ₹3,000, during which one of the appellants was claimed to have been caught red-handed. The High Court undertook a meticulous reappraisal of the entire oral and documentary evidence, including the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, trap proceedings, forensic reports, and sanction orders. The Court reiterated the settled legal position that, for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the three essential ingredients, namely a clear and specific demand of illegal gratification, acceptance or recovery of the bribe amount, and pendency of work with the accused. On an exhaustive scrutiny of the record, the Court found that the prosecution had failed to establish these foundational requirements. The alleged demand on the initial date was unsupported by any independent evidence, was not corroborated by contemporaneous recordings, and was contradicted by official duty records showing that one of the appellants was not even present at the place of occurrence. With regard to the trap proceedings, the Court noted that the currency notes were not recovered from the conscious possession of the accused and were instead found scattered on the floor. The phenolphthalein test did not yield the expected result, and several prosecution witnesses themselves admitted that the accused had not accepted the money. The presence of independent witnesses, including the Railway Magistrate, at the spot was acknowledged, yet none were examined by the prosecution, which further weakened the case. The High Court also examined the voice recordings and their transcriptions relied upon by the prosecution and found that they did not disclose any explicit or unequivocal demand for bribe. On the contrary, the conversations reflected vague and ambiguous exchanges, insufficient in law to constitute a demand. The Court emphasised that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non for attracting the offences under the Act and cannot be inferred from conjectures or incomplete conversations. Serious infirmities were also found in the grant of prosecution sanction. The sanction orders were found to be stereotyped, mechanically issued, and lacking any indication of proper application of mind to the distinct role attributed to each accused. The evidence showed that the alleged work of the complainant was not pending with the appellants at the relevant time, as the file had already been forwarded for approval prior to the trap. In view of these cumulative deficiencies, the High Court concluded that the findings recorded by the trial court were unsustainable and based on misappreciation of evidence. Holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, the Court allowed the criminal appeal, set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.05.2023, and acquitted all the appellants of the offences alleged against them