Author: Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal

Jaipur High Court Affirms Acquittal in Alleged Murder Case: No Interference Warranted When Trial Court’s View Is a “Possible View” on Evidence

Jaipur High Court Affirms Acquittal in Alleged Murder Case: No Interference Warranted When Trial Court’s View Is a “Possible View” on Evidence Case Title: Raju Devi Bunkar v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., D.B. Criminal Appeal (Db) No. 302/2025 — Date of Judgment: 08/12/2025 The present appeal arises from the acquittal of respondent Govind in offences including Sections 302, 342 and 323 IPC by the trial court and the subsequent challenge to that order before the High Court. The factual matrix, as recorded in the judgment, shows that on 03.11.2012 a report (P.I.-11) was lodged regarding the death of Uttam Kumar and competing versions were placed on record by family witnesses and the accused’s side; the investigation culminated in charge-sheeting under various sections and ultimately resulted in the trial court recording acquittal on 24.04.2025. 203000003022025_5 The appellate record recounts that multiple witnesses were examined in trial — including eyewitnesses, local persons and medical evidence — and that there were significant divergences in the statements and respective versions about the events of 03.11.2012. The High Court’s summary of evidence (see pages 4–6 of the file) highlights inconsistencies in eyewitness accounts, gaps in forensic/medical corroboration for homicidal assault, and particulars such as timing, injuries and the presence or absence of demonstrative indicia on the deceased’s person that bear on the reliability of the prosecution case. The learned trial court’s approach, as noticed by the Division Bench, was to closely evaluate the oral testimony presented and to find that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the trial court therefore returned a view favourable to the accused. The High Court adverted to the trial court’s reasoning, including the manner in which the trial court treated the discrepancies and the nature of corroboration tendered, and placed those findings in the context of appellate interference doctrine. In applying established appellate principles, the Bench relied on the Supreme Court guidance cited in the judgment (Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka and related authority), reiterating that an appellate court can disturb an acquittal only where the trial court’s view is patently perverse, is based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where no two reasonable views are possible — in short, where the only possible conclusion from the record is guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment reproduces and applies these principles to the facts of the case (see paragraph 13–14 of the judgment). After a considered re-appreciation of the record, the Division Bench concluded that the trial court’s view was a possible view which could reasonably be drawn from the evidence on record and that the scope for interference was therefore absent. The High Court recorded that neither legal nor factual infirmity of the nature required to overturn an acquittal was made out on the material before it, and accordingly the appellate challenge was dismissed and the trial court’s order of acquittal dated 24.04.2025 was held to be sustainable. The judgment directs that the decree be communicated to the trial court and is confined to the determination of the appeal under the criminal appellate jurisdiction; it does not re-open factual findings beyond the permissible limits of appellate review as spelled out in the authorities relied upon by the Bench. Read complete order here By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal

Bail in NDPS Act

Bail in NDPS Act The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) is one of the strictest criminal laws in India. Getting bail in NDPS cases is far more difficult than in ordinary criminal matters because the Act aims to curb drug abuse, trafficking, and illegal possession. In this article, we break down the legal principles, bail conditions, court approach, case laws, and practical strategies used in NDPS bail matters. 1. Why Bail in NDPS is Difficult? The NDPS Act reverses the normal presumption of innocence.Once the police claim recovery of commercial quantity, the burden shifts on the accused to prove innocence at the bail stage. Two reasons make NDPS bail complex: Section 37 NDPS prohibits bail in certain cases. Courts treat drug-related offences as a threat to society. Thus, NDPS bail is not similar to bail under CrPC. 2. Types of NDPS Offences and Their Impact on Bail The nature of recovery directly affects bail possibilities. Type of Quantity Meaning Bail Position Small Quantity Very small amount defined under NDPS Notification Bail is easy — Section 37 does NOT apply Intermediate Quantity Between small and commercial Court considers facts; Section 37 does NOT apply Commercial Quantity Large quantity defined in law Bail is extremely difficult — Section 37 applies When Section 37 applies, the accused must satisfy the twin-conditions. Small Quantity, Intermediate Quantity & Commercial Quantity in NDPS – Detailed Explanation The NDPS Act classifies offences based on the quantity of the drug involved. This classification directly affects punishment, bail eligibility, and court approach. Understanding these categories is crucial because the entire bail strategy in NDPS cases depends on whether the recovery is small, intermediate, or commercial. 1. Small Quantity Under NDPS Act Small quantity is the minimum amount of a drug specified under government notification. Every narcotic drug or psychotropic substance has a defined “small quantity” limit—for example: Heroin: 5 grams Ganja: 1000 grams (1 kg) Cocaine: 2 grams MDMA/ Ecstasy: 0.5 grams Punishment for Small Quantity (Section 27 & 21(a)) Maximum 1 year imprisonment, OR Fine, OR Both The law recognizes that small quantity cases often involve addicts, not traffickers. So punishment and bail rules are lenient. Bail Position for Small Quantity Section 37 NDPS does NOT apply. Bail is treated like a normal CrPC bail. Courts usually grant bail unless:✓ Accused has past drug offences✓ There is violence or other offences linked with the case✓ The investigation indicates a trafficking network Typical Grounds for Bail in Small Quantity Cases Personal consumption First-time offender No criminal history Minor recovery No independent evidence of sale/trafficking Small quantity cases rarely require High Court intervention because Sessions Courts generally grant bail quickly. 2. Intermediate Quantity Under NDPS Act Intermediate quantity refers to any amount between small quantity and commercial quantity. For example, for heroin (small: 5g, commercial: 250g): Any recovery between 5g and 250g is intermediate. Punishment (Section 21(b)) Up to 10 years imprisonment Fine up to ₹1 lakh Punishment is higher than small quantity but not as strict as commercial quantity. Bail Position for Intermediate Quantity Section 37 does NOT apply, meaning the strict “twin-conditions” are not required. Court only checks:✓ Nature of allegations✓ Role of accused✓ Possibility of tampering with evidence✓ Criminal antecedents✓ Compliance of NDPS procedures Intermediate quantity cases fall in a grey zone—not too small, not too large—so bail depends heavily on specific facts. When Courts Grant Bail in Intermediate Quantity Recovery doubtful or planted Non-compliance of Sections 42, 50, 57 No conscious possession FSL report not submitted Accused connected only through call records or disclosure statement Long custody (6–12 months or more) When Courts Refuse Bail Direct recovery from accused Evidence of trafficking network Accused absconded earlier Repeated offences Intermediate quantity bail requires solid legal argument and attention to procedural defects. 3. Commercial Quantity Under NDPS Act Commercial quantity represents large-scale drug trafficking, and the limits are strictly defined. Examples: Heroin: 250 grams or more Ganja: 20 kg or more Cocaine: 100 grams or more MDMA: 50 grams or more Punishment (Section 21(c)) Minimum 10 years imprisonment Maximum 20 years Fine of ₹1–2 lakhs or more Because the punishment is extremely severe, the NDPS Act introduces the toughest bail restrictions for commercial quantity cases. Bail Position for Commercial Quantity — Section 37 Applies This is the most important bail rule:Bail cannot be granted unless BOTH conditions are met: Court must be satisfied accused is not guilty. Accused is not likely to commit an offence on bail. Additionally: Public Prosecutor must be heard. Court must record “reasonable grounds” in the bail order. This makes commercial quantity bail rare but not impossible. How Courts Analyse Commercial Quantity Bail Courts carefully examine: (a) Procedural Violations No written information under Section 42 Illegal search or seizure Section 50 notice incorrect Samples not properly drawn or sealed No independent witnesses Same officer conducting seizure & investigation (Mohan Lal case) (b) Weak Evidence of Conscious Possession If drugs are found in: Common areas Shared vehicles Shared rooms Fields or open spacesbail becomes stronger. (c) Length of Custody & Delay in Trial Supreme Court has granted bail where the accused spent 3+ years in jail and trial was slow (Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha). (d) Medical Grounds Serious health issues can justify bail even in Section 37 cases. Comparison Table: Small vs Intermediate vs Commercial Quantity Factor Small Intermediate Commercial Section 37 Applies? No No Yes Bail Difficulty Easy Moderate Very Difficult Punishment Up to 1 year Up to 10 years 10–20 years Court Approach Liberal Balanced Very Strict Common Defence Personal use Procedural lapses Non-compliance & long custody Trial Duration Impact Moderate High Very High (favors bail if delayed) Final Understanding Small quantity cases are treated leniently; bail is usually granted. Intermediate quantity cases depend on facts; good defence can secure bail. Commercial quantity cases face strict barriers under Section 37, but bail is still possible if investigation is faulty, evidence is weak, or custody is prolonged. 3. Section 37 NDPS Act – The Biggest Barrier to

Best POCSO Advocate in Jaipur – Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal 7300056080

Best POCSO Advocate in Jaipur – Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal 7300056080 The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act is one of the most sensitive and complex areas of criminal law. When a family faces a POCSO case—whether as a complainant or as an accused—it needs a lawyer who understands the law deeply and handles the matter with care, clarity, and strategy. Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal is widely recognised as the Best POCSO Advocate in Jaipur, known for his strong courtroom presence and compassionate approach in cases involving minors. Best POCSO Advocate in Jaipur for Bail and Anticipatory Bail Securing bail or anticipatory bail in POCSO cases requires detailed case preparation, understanding of medical evidence, digital evidence, and statements of minors. Advocate Bhuvnesh Goyal has handled numerous bail matters before the POCSO Courts and the Rajasthan High Court. His clear drafting and strategic arguments help clients get timely relief in critical situations. Best POCSO Advocate in Jaipur for Defence in False Allegations False POCSO cases can destroy a person’s reputation, career, and peace of mind. Advocate Bhuvnesh Goyal specialises in building strong defence strategies by examining contradictions in statements, CCTV evidence, call records, medical reports, and other technical material. His goal is to protect the rights of the accused while ensuring the case is presented fairly before the court. Best POCSO Advocate in Jaipur for FIR Quashing & High Court Matters Many clients approach Advocate Goyal to file FIR quashing petitions under Section 482 CrPC when the allegations are fabricated or exaggerated. His experience in High Court litigation makes him one of the most trusted choices for people seeking to close a wrongly initiated case at an early stage. His petitions are drafted with clarity and supported with proper legal grounds. Best POCSO Advocate in Jaipur for Trial Representation In POCSO cases, the trial stage is the most crucial. Cross-examination of witnesses, handling testimony of minors, and presenting evidence require exceptional skill. Advocate Bhuvnesh Goyal is known for his structured courtroom strategy, strong arguments, and ability to simplify complex evidence for the court. His clients value his practical guidance and transparent communication throughout the trial. Best POCSO Advocate in Jaipur for Appeals & Legal Remedies If a party is dissatisfied with a judgment, they need a lawyer who can present the case powerfully in appeal, revision, or suspension of sentence. Advocate Goyal regularly appears before appellate courts, helping clients challenge wrongful convictions or defend favourable judgments. His legal research, drafting style, and preparation make him a preferred advocate for POCSO appeals. Why People Consider Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal the Best POCSO Advocate in Jaipur Strong knowledge of POCSO procedures Expert in bail, anticipatory bail, and FIR quashing Sensitive handling of cases involving minors Clear guidance during police investigation Effective defence in false or exaggerated allegations High-quality drafting, research, and courtroom advocacy Transparent communication and client-focused approach Need Help in a POCSO Case? POCSO matters are serious and emotionally stressful. Having the right lawyer can change the entire outcome of the case.For consultation or urgent legal support, contact: 📞 Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalPhone: 7300056080Jaipur, Rajasthan

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 India’s Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO), 2012, was supposed to be the steel frame around a fragile child. It set out to define, criminalise and make punishable every form of sexual violence against children — and at the same time to build procedures that keep a child’s dignity intact while the state seeks justice. In practice, POCSO has been both a landmark and a mirror: it exposes not only the uglier impulses of abusers but the gaps in policing, medical care, judicial capacity and social understanding. To judge its success we must look at law on the books, law in action, and the global context from which ideas and responsibilities flow. This article is a lengthy, careful excavation of POCSO — its anatomy, amendments, functioning, friction points, and how it sits amid international standards and other national laws. It draws on the Act itself, government guidelines and recent institutional practice, and situates India’s approach beside major international instruments such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (and its Optional Protocols) and the Council of Europe’s Lanzarote Convention, as well as domestic statutes in the UK and the United States that crowd the same terrain. Wherever authority lets us, we anchor claims to primary sources.  1. Why a separate law for children? For decades, crimes against children were prosecuted under general provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) — sections on assault, rape, obscenity, and so on. Those provisions were rarely tailored to the distinct vulnerabilities of children (physical, psychological, developmental) nor to processes that protect their identity and mental health during investigation and trial. International human rights law — notably the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and its protocols — created a moral and legal imperative for states to treat children not as small adults but as rights-holders with special protections. India’s POCSO was born in that global moment and domesticated it for Indian courts.  POCSO’s aims were threefold: (a) to create specific and wide-ranging offences (including sexual harassment and child pornography); (b) to streamline procedures so that reporting, recording, medical examination and trial are child-sensitive; and (c) to ensure speedy trial through special courts. Its architecture therefore combines criminal law, child-protection procedures, and administrative rules. 2. A tour of the Act: definitions, offences and procedure Who is a “child”? POCSO defines a child as any person below 18 years of age. This bright-line definition simplifies application but also creates hard questions when age is disputed — for example, in medico-legal examinations and when consent claims surface. The Act treats the age threshold as central to the offence; an act that might be lawful between adults becomes an offence if one participant is below 18. Offences and categories The Act creates several categories of offences: Penetrative sexual assault — broadly analogous to rape but defined to capture any penetration (however slight) of the sexual organs, anus or mouth. Aggravated penetrative sexual assault — uses of weapons, multiple perpetrators, or the involvement of a person in a position of trust (teacher, doctor, guardian) carry heftier punishments. Sexual assault (non-penetrative) — includes groping, forced kissing and similar acts. Sexual harassment — encompasses acts like stalking, making sexually coloured remarks, and showing sexual content. Use of child for pornography — both production and distribution are criminalised. Punishments are severe: imprisonment terms run from several years to life imprisonment, and the 2019 amendments strengthened penalties further for specific aggravating circumstances. The law also allows for fines and compensation directed to child welfare.  Procedure designed for children This is where POCSO sought real innovation: Mandatory reporting: Certain categories of professionals and any person who learns of an offence can — and, in some cases, must — report to police or a child welfare agency. Failure to report can attract penalties. Special Juvenile Police Units (SJPU) and Special Courts: The government envisaged trained police and separate trial courts to make the process less traumatic and more expedient. Recording of statement: A child’s statement is to be recorded at the child’s residence or a place of her/his choice; the law recognises the need to avoid repeated courtroom exposure. Medical examination: The Act lays down procedures to ensure a child is examined with consent, dignity, and confidentiality; in many cases, female doctors should be preferred when the victim is a female child. Child-friendly testimony: Courts are permitted to use video testimony and screens to shield a child from seeing the accused, and the courtroom language and processes are to be adapted for the child’s comprehension. Government agencies, including the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), have issued operational guidelines elaborating these duties and the role of “support persons” to guide child victims through the legal maze. These guidelines also emphasize rehabilitation and tracking via dedicated portals. 3. Realities on the ground: implementation gaps and exemplars Legislation is only as strong as its implementation. On paper, POCSO’s child-centric vision is attractive; in practice, it collides with realities: Police and training Special Juvenile Police Units were envisioned as trained, sensitised wings of the force. But in many districts the SJPU is a small unit with limited training, and front-line officers often lack basic orientation about trauma-informed interviewing, confidentiality norms, or proper medical referral channels. Media and institutional reports repeatedly point to situations where police conduct insensitive cross-examinations, insist on revealing a minor’s identity to hospital staff, or fail to produce the child in court in a timely fashion — all of which re-traumatise the victim. Recent news reports show police pressure on doctors to reveal identities despite legal protections — signaling a persistent knowledge and practice gap.  Medical interface Forensic and medical examination is a crucible of controversies. Clinicians must balance timely evidence collection with consent and privacy obligations. While POCSO contemplates child-sensitive exams, hospitals often lack trained pediatric forensic teams, and practices vary between urban tertiary centres and rural clinics. The Supreme Court has issued guidance on

Bail in POCSO Act Cases

Bail in Pocso Bail under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 is not routine. Courts apply a stricter standard because the Act deals with offences against children. However, the law does not impose an absolute bar on bail.As a senior advocate before the Supreme Court, I can say that the strength of evidence, delay in FIR, medical report, conduct of the accused, and the child’s statement—all play a crucial role in determining bail. A case registered under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) can have serious consequences for an accused because allegations under the Act involve offences against children and are dealt with by designated Special Courts. However, registration of a POCSO FIR does not mean that bail is legally impossible. The law relating to bail in POCSO cases is governed by the general law of bail, the POCSO Act and, for offences governed by the new criminal-law framework, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). POCSO itself provides that the general procedural law applies to proceedings before the Special Court, subject to the Act. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr., 2026 INSC 47, is particularly important. The Court reaffirmed that bail proceedings are not meant to become a mini-trial and that the ordinary principles governing bail continue to apply to POCSO cases. This article explains regular bail, anticipatory bail, default bail, interim bail, the effect of Section 29 POCSO, important bail grounds, the procedure for filing a POCSO bail application, relevant Supreme Court principles and the factors considered by courts. Understanding Bail in POCSO and Why Bail is Sensitive Bail in a POCSO case means release of an accused from custody subject to conditions imposed by the competent court. POCSO cases are serious criminal proceedings, but the POCSO Act does not create an absolute prohibition on bail. The general principles of criminal bail continue to operate unless a specific statutory restriction applies. Under the current criminal procedure framework, Section 480 BNSS deals with bail in non-bailable offences, Section 482 BNSS deals with anticipatory bail, and Section 483 BNSS gives special bail powers to the High Court and Court of Session. Therefore, the correct legal position is: A person accused in a POCSO case can apply for bail, but the court exercises considerable judicial discretion after considering the allegations, evidence, age of the child, seriousness of the offence, possibility of influencing witnesses, possibility of tampering with evidence, antecedents and other circumstances. The POCSO Act was enacted to protect children (below 18 years) from: Sexual assault Sexual harassment Pornography Aggravated forms of assault Because these offences concern a minor, courts approach bail applications with: Higher scrutiny Victim-centric approach Requirement of prima facie satisfaction But the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that: “Bail cannot be denied merely because the offence is serious. Every accused has a right to liberty unless the prosecution shows real risk of misuse.” Thus, the law balances child protection with constitutional rights under Article 21. Is Bail Possible in a POCSO Case? Yes. Bail is legally possible in a POCSO case. The fact that an FIR contains offences under the POCSO Act does not create an absolute statutory bar against bail. At the same time, POCSO allegations are treated seriously. The court must balance two competing considerations: Protection of the child and the integrity of the prosecution; and The accused’s right to personal liberty and a fair criminal process. The Supreme Court has emphasized that POCSO does not itself create an entirely separate and unlimited regime of bail restrictions. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, the Supreme Court discussed the constitutional foundations of bail and stated that ordinary bail principles remain applicable to POCSO offences. Which Law Governs Bail in POCSO Cases After 1 July 2024? The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for new criminal proceedings from 1 July 2024. The principal bail provisions under BNSS are: Type of Bail Relevant BNSS Provision Bail in non-bailable offence  Section 480 BNSS Anticipatory bail Section 482 BNSS High Court/Sessions Court bail powers Section 483 BNSS Default/statutory bail Section 187(3) BNSS Bail bond and sureties Sections 485 onwards Cancellation/forfeiture-related provisions   Older judgments may therefore refer to Sections 437, 438 and 439 CrPC. For proceedings governed by BNSS, the corresponding provisions are generally Sections 480, 482 and 483 BNSS. 2. Types of Bail Applicable in POCSO Cases (a) Regular Bail – Section 437 and 439 CrPC (now Section 480 and 483 BNSS) Regular bail is sought after the accused has been arrested. Under Section 480 BNSS, a person accused of a non-bailable offence may be released on bail subject to the statutory framework and judicial discretion. The provision also permits the court to impose conditions designed to ensure appearance, prevent repetition of offences and prevent inducement, threats or tampering with evidence. In a POCSO case, regular bail may be considered: During investigation; After filing of the charge-sheet; After cognizance; After framing of charges; During trial; After examination of important witnesses; Where trial is substantially delayed; Where the accused has undergone considerable custody. Whether accused will influence the child witness Evidence strength Medical report consistency In case, Section 480 BNSS bail is rejected then bail in pocso is filed before the court of Session under section 483 BNSS. In case court of session also rejects the regular bail in pocso after arrest then the bail on pocso is filed before the respective High Court under section 483 BNSS. Further, if the High Court also rejects the regular bail in pocso, then either a second bail may be filed before the same high court in case circumstances changes or new evidence arises or bail can be filed in Supreme Court as well after the rejection of bail from the high court.  (b) Anticipatory Bail – Section 438 CrPC (now Section 482 BNSS) Anticipatory bail is sought before arrest when a person has a reasonable apprehension of arrest

Rajasthan High Court Directs Consideration of Representation for Correction of Subject in RPSC Assistant Professor Application

Rajasthan High Court Directs Consideration of Representation for Correction of Subject in RPSC Assistant Professor Application Case Title: Archana Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18962/2025Date of Judgment: 06.12.2025 The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, through Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Kumar Jain, decided S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18962/2025 filed by Ms. Archana Chaudhary. The petitioner, aged about 33 years and resident of Jaipur, had approached the Court seeking relief in relation to her online application for the post of Assistant Professor (College Education) – 2025. Her grievance was that in Application No. 202549023583, her subject had been recorded as “Hindi” instead of “Geography,” which according to her did not match her academic qualification and earlier application record.  In the writ petition, the petitioner prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC) to correct the subject in her application from “Hindi” to “Geography.” She further sought a direction that her candidature be considered for the post of Assistant Professor in the subject of Geography and that she be permitted to participate in all subsequent stages of the recruitment process accordingly. Along with this, she requested that the Court quash and set aside the verbal or oral refusal allegedly made by the Commission in regard to consideration of her representation, and that the respondents be directed to pass a reasoned and speaking order on her representation dated 01.12.2025.  During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a Division Bench judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Harendra Gawaria and Ors., reported as 2022 Supreme (Raj.) 643. On the strength of this decision, it was submitted that the controversy raised by the petitioner already stood covered and resolved. Relying on this precedent, it was urged that the petitioner may at least be granted permission to submit an appropriate representation before the competent authority so that her grievance regarding correction of the subject and consideration of candidature could be examined in accordance with law.  The Court considered the grievance raised by the petitioner in the light of the submissions made. Instead of granting the substantive relief of direct correction of the subject in the application form or issuing a positive mandamus to treat the petitioner as a Geography candidate, the Court chose to dispose of the writ petition by providing a structured remedy through representation. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to submit a detailed representation to the respondents–authority within a period of three days, raising all grounds available to her with respect to the error in the subject and its impact on her candidature.  The Court also issued clear directions to the respondents–authority regarding how such representation was to be dealt with. It directed that the representation be considered and decided after making an enquiry about the grievances raised by the petitioner. This exercise was to be undertaken in the light of the Division Bench judgment in Union of India and Ors. v. Harendra Gawaria and Ors. (supra). The Court further directed that, in case the respondents chose to deviate from the position emerging from the said judgment or otherwise did not accept the petitioner’s claim, they must pass a reasoned and speaking order. This decision was to be taken within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of the representation and in any case before 15th December 2025.  The judgment also places an obligation on the respondents to communicate their decision to the petitioner. It is specifically recorded that the decision must be conveyed either by way of speed post or through e-mail, if the petitioner has provided an e-mail address in her representation. This direction ensures that the petitioner is informed of the outcome in a timely and verifiable manner, enabling her to take further steps, if necessary, without delay.  Finally, the Court preserved the petitioner’s right to seek further judicial remedy. It observed that if, after the decision on her representation, the petitioner still felt aggrieved, she would be at liberty to approach the Court again by filing a fresh petition. With these directions and observations, the writ petition, along with any pending applications, was disposed of.  Through this judgment, the Rajasthan High Court confined itself to providing a procedural route and a time-bound mechanism for redressal of the petitioner’s grievance regarding correction of the subject in her RPSC Assistant Professor (College Education) – 2025 application, without entering into or adjudicating upon the merits of the claim itself. Read complete order here By Advocate Bhuvesh Kumar Goyal

Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) Grants Bail under Section 483 BNSS in Alleged Online Siphoning Case

Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) Grants Bail under Section 483 BNSS in Alleged Online Siphoning Case Case Title: Tahir S/o Late Shri Illiyas v. State of RajasthanDate of Judgment: 06.12.2025 The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 14032/2025, decided on 06 December 2025 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sameer Jain, considered a bail application filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The accused–applicant, Tahir S/o Late Shri Illiyas, aged about 40 years and resident of Ward No. 4, Meo Mohalla, Barodameo, District Alwar, was at the time of hearing confined in Central Jail, Alwar. The case arose out of FIR No. 248/2025 registered at Police Station Baroda Meo, District Alwar.  As per the order, the FIR was registered for offences under Sections 316(2), 318(4), 112(2), 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 66(D) of the Information Technology Act, 2008. The prosecution case, as recorded in the bail order, related to an allegation of siphoning an amount of ₹57,000/- by using a bank account on the basis of commission. The applicant had been arrested in connection with this FIR and remained in judicial custody since 30.09.2025. On behalf of the accused–applicant, learned counsel submitted before the Court that the applicant is the sole bread earner of his family. It was further pointed out that he had been in custody since 30 September 2025 and that the investigation in the matter had culminated in filing of the charge-sheet. Reliance was placed on these factual circumstances to urge that continued incarceration of the applicant was not warranted and that he may be enlarged on bail in the pending criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 248/2025. The learned Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State of Rajasthan, opposed the bail application. The order records that the State resisted the plea for bail and prayed for rejection of the application, without detailing any additional factual assertions beyond the offences mentioned in the FIR and the nature of allegations already noted. After hearing both sides, the Court considered “the overall facts” of the case. While doing so, the Court specifically took note of three key circumstances: first, that the applicant is the sole bread earner of his family; second, that he has remained in custody since 30.09.2025; and third, that the charge-sheet has already been filed in the matter. Having regard to these points and the overall facts and circumstances, the Court recorded that, without commenting upon the merits or demerits of the case, it was inclined to enlarge the accused–applicant on bail. Consequently, the bail application filed under Section 483 BNSS was allowed. The High Court ordered that the accused–applicant Tahir S/o Late Shri Illiyas be released on bail, subject to his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹50,000/- along with two sureties of ₹25,000/- each, to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge. The applicant was directed to appear before the concerned court on all dates of hearing as and when called upon to do so. With these conditions, the Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court granted bail to the applicant in connection with FIR No. 248/2025 registered at Police Station Baroda Meo, District Alwar. Read Complete order here By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal

Grant of Bail Under Section 483 BNSS in Money Doubling and Online Gambling Case: Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench’s Approach

Grant of Bail Under Section 483 BNSS in Money Doubling and Online Gambling Case: Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench’s Approach Case Title: Umesh S/o Murari Lal v. State of RajasthanDate of Judgment: 06.12.2025 The Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, per Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sameer Jain, decided S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 14043/2025 filed by Umesh S/o Murari Lal, a 23-year-old accused who was in judicial custody in District Jail, Sawai Madhopur. The application was moved under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which confers special powers on the High Court and Court of Session in relation to bail. The order is a short but clear illustration of how the Court is applying the new BNSS framework to regular bail, particularly in economic offences involving online activity and gambling elements.  The FIR in question, being FIR No. 315/2025 registered at Police Station Kotwali, Sawai Madhopur, invokes several provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, namely Sections 318(4), 319(2), 336(3), 338 and 112(2). Alongside these, the police have added Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2008 and Section 13 of the Rajasthan Public Gambling Ordinance, 1949. Collectively, these provisions point towards allegations of cheating through electronic means and participation in or promotion of gambling activities, with the specific allegation here relating to a “doubling of money” scheme where the amount involved is stated to be Rs. 83,000/-. The FIR has been lodged by the police authorities themselves, which suggests that the case emerged from investigative, cyber or surveillance inputs rather than a private complainant approaching the police directly.  On behalf of the accused-applicant, learned counsel emphasised three core aspects. First, the applicant’s young age—only 23 years—was highlighted as a relevant circumstance calling for a reform-oriented approach rather than prolonged incarceration at the pre-trial stage. Second, the Court was informed that the applicant had already been in custody since 14.10.2025, meaning that by the time the bail application came up for consideration, he had spent a substantial period in jail without the trial having commenced or concluded. Third, the defence pointed out that, on the prosecution’s own showing, the monetary amount involved was Rs. 83,000/-, which, though not trivial for an individual victim, is still within a limited range in the spectrum of economic offences. These submissions, taken together, were aimed at persuading the Court that continued detention would be excessive and that the purposes of investigation could be met even if the applicant were released on conditions.  The State, represented by the learned Public Prosecutors, opposed the bail application and urged the Court not to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant. Although the order records this opposition in brief, without setting out detailed arguments, it can reasonably be inferred that the prosecution stressed the nature of the offences—particularly cheating using electronic means under the IT Act and gambling-related activity under the Rajasthan Public Gambling Ordinance—as well as the possibility of the accused engaging in similar activities if released. In such cases, State opposition normally rests on concerns of deterrence, the risk of repetition of the offence, and the need to send a message that online financial frauds and gambling rackets will be dealt with firmly. After hearing both sides, the Court proceeded to analyse the case through the lens of Section 483 BNSS. This provision, titled “Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail”, enables the High Court to grant bail in appropriate cases, subject to notice to the Public Prosecutor and other statutory safeguards. In the present matter, instead of going into a detailed examination of the evidence, the Court consciously confined itself to broad factors such as the age of the accused, the duration of custody, the amount involved, and the overall circumstances. Justice Sameer Jain clearly recorded that the applicant is a young person aged 23 years, has been in custody since 14.10.2025, and that the amount alleged in the money-doubling scheme is Rs. 83,000/-. Importantly, the Court made it explicit that it was not commenting on the merits or demerits of the prosecution case at this stage.  This cautious approach is consistent with the settled principle that bail orders should not prejudge the trial or make detailed factual findings that might affect the final adjudication. Instead, the High Court focused on whether, at the present stage of proceedings, further incarceration of the applicant was necessary. Having considered the material on record, the Court came to the conclusion that the balance leaned in favour of granting bail. The reasoning reflects a broader trend in modern criminal jurisprudence, including under the BNSS, that pre-trial detention is an exception and personal liberty must be protected unless there are strong reasons to deny bail, such as risk of absconding, likelihood of tampering with evidence, or a clear threat to public order. On the basis of this assessment, the High Court allowed the application under Section 483 BNSS and directed that the accused-applicant be enlarged on bail. The conditions imposed by the Court are standard but significant: Umesh is required to furnish a personal bond of Rs. 50,000/- along with two sureties of Rs. 25,000/- each, to the satisfaction of the trial court. He is obligated to appear before the concerned court on all dates of hearing as and when called upon. These conditions serve a dual function: they secure the presence of the accused during trial and also act as a reminder that bail comes with responsibilities, not as an unfettered freedom.  From a legal practitioner’s perspective, the order offers several practical takeaways. First, it confirms that under the BNSS regime, Section 483 remains a robust tool before the High Court for seeking regular bail, especially where factors such as youth, limited amount involved, and significant pre-trial custody are present. Second, even in cases involving cyber elements and gambling, the Court will not automatically treat the matter as requiring continued detention if the alleged amount is modest and the investigation does not demand the physical custody of the

Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench Follows Ravi Agarwal Precedent in Cluster of Income Tax Writ Petitions

Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench Follows Ravi Agarwal Precedent in Cluster of Income Tax Writ Petitions Case Title: Ram Babu Gupta v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle-1, Jaipur & Connected Matters Date of Judgment / Order: 06 December 2025 This order of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, deals with a large group of writ petitions filed by three assessees – Ram Babu Gupta, Ashwani Gupta and Anil Singhvi – all challenging actions of the Income Tax Department, mainly the Central Circles at Jaipur. The petitions were heard together because they raised a common legal issue arising out of income tax proceedings initiated by the Department. Looking at the array of parties, it is clear that the challenge was not to an isolated order, but to a particular pattern of action by the investigation and assessment machinery of the Department, involving the DGIT (Investigation), Principal Commissioner and various Central Circles.  The Division Bench notes at the very outset that “the issue involved in these petitions is common” and therefore directs that all matters be tagged. This is a standard but important procedural step. It ensures consistency of outcome, avoids conflicting orders in similar fact situations, and saves judicial time. For taxpayers and practitioners, this tagging also signals that the petitions were part of a wider controversy in income-tax administration at Jaipur, not just a one-off grievance.  The heart of the order lies in the short but significant observation that the “controversy involved in the present cases is no more res integra and stands resolved” by an earlier order of a co-ordinate Bench dated 16.09.2025 in Shri Ravi Agarwal v. Income Tax Officer & Ors., D.B. CWP No. 11981/2025. Both sides – counsel for the petitioners and counsel for the Department – agreed that the legal issue already stands concluded by that earlier judgment and jointly requested disposal of the present petitions “in terms thereof”.  The expression res integra simply means that an issue is untouched or undecided. When the Bench records that the controversy is no longer res integra, it is formally accepting that the point of law has already been decided by the Court in an earlier case. This is not a casual remark: it reflects the doctrine of judicial discipline within the High Court. A Division Bench ordinarily follows the view of a co-ordinate Division Bench on the same question of law. If it wants to differ, the proper course is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. By choosing to follow Ravi Agarwal without hesitation, the Bench reaffirms that internal consistency of precedent is a key part of the rule of law. The order is also significant for the way it records the stand of counsel. Learned counsel for both sides fairly accepted that Ravi Agarwal governs the field and jointly requested that these petitions be disposed of on that basis. This is how well-conducted tax litigation should proceed. Once a legal issue has been tested and decided by the Court, repeating the same debate in every similar matter only adds to pendency and uncertainty. By inviting disposal in terms of an existing judgment, the parties allow quick relief to the assessees while ensuring that the Department also gets a clear and uniform framework to work with. Although the present order does not restate the detailed reasoning of Ravi Agarwal, it effectively extends the benefit of that precedent to all the tagged petitioners. In practical terms, this means that whatever legal protection, directions or restrictions were laid down in Ravi Agarwal now apply mutatis mutandis to Mr. Ram Babu Gupta, Mr. Ashwani Gupta and Mr. Anil Singhvi in respect of their contested income-tax proceedings. The Court uses a familiar formula – the petitions are “disposed of in terms thereof” – to import the earlier ratio without rewriting it. This technique is often used when the Court is faced with repetitive matters governed by the same principle. For assessees and tax practitioners, an order of this nature is still quite valuable despite its brevity. First, it confirms that the High Court views the petitioners’ grievances as part of an already adjudicated legal issue, which strengthens their position against any inconsistent departmental approach in future. If any lower authority tries to distinguish their case artificially, the assessees can rely on this order to say that the High Court has itself treated the controversy as identical to Ravi Agarwal. Secondly, by clubbing a series of petitions involving different assessment years, different Central Circles and even different types of departmental orders, the Court is implicitly accepting that the underlying legal defect or concern is structural rather than individual. That could relate, for example, to the manner in which certain proceedings were initiated, authorised, or transferred within the central circles. Even though the precise point is set out in Ravi Agarwal and not repeated here, this clustering makes it easier for similarly placed taxpayers to seek relief by demonstrating parity with either the lead case or these follow-up matters. Thirdly, the order brings finality to all pending applications within these petitions. By clarifying that “pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of”, the Bench leaves no loose ends. This is crucial in tax matters, where interim applications often deal with stay of demand, protection from coercive steps, or maintenance of status quo in assessment. Once the main petitions are disposed of on the strength of a precedent, those interim protections naturally merge into the final order structure laid down in the earlier judgment. From a doctrinal standpoint, the order is a neat illustration of how High Courts manage precedent in specialised areas like tax. Instead of treating each writ petition as a standalone battle, the Court identifies a “test case” – here Ravi Agarwal – and then uses it as the governing decision for subsequent matters. This practice reduces the risk of contradictory views emerging from different Benches and gives the Department clear guidance on how to align its processes with constitutional and statutory requirements. In summary, the

Arrest in India: Police Powers, Rights & BNSS Section 35

Arrest in India: Police Powers, Rights & BNSS Section 35 If you are reading this, you are probably in one of two situations: You are afraid that you or a loved one may be arrested soon, or You are a victim and want to know how to get the accused arrested. In both situations, the word “arrest” creates fear, confusion and a feeling of helplessness. As a practising lawyer, I can tell you: half of this fear comes from not knowing the law. This article is written in simple English, from the point of view of a common person, but with the seriousness and depth that a senior advocate would bring. It focuses on current law after the new criminal codes (Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita – BNS, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita – BNSS) and also mentions the older CrPC section numbers that people still search for. 1. Which law applies today? BNSS vs CrPC From 1 July 2024, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) has replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) for new cases. It lays down the procedure for arrest, investigation, trial and bail. However: Older cases may still be governed by CrPC, The principles on arrest and rights remain broadly similar. Throughout this article, I will write like this: Section 35 BNSS (earlier Section 41 & 41A CrPC) – arrest without warrant so that you can understand both the new and the old references that appear in FIRs, orders, and on the internet. 2. What exactly is “arrest”? Arrest means taking a person into custody under legal authority, in such a manner that the person’s liberty is restrained and he/she is not free to leave. It is different from: Calling to the police station for enquiry – where you are technically free to leave, though in practice this is often misused. Simple questioning at home or on the road – this alone is not arrest. Detention – sometimes police say “we have only detained you, not arrested you”. If you are not free to go, the law and courts may still treat it as arrest or illegal detention. 3. Who can arrest in India? Under BNSS Chapter V – Arrest of Persons, the following can arrest: Police officers This is the most common. They can arrest with or without warrant depending on the case. Private persons A common citizen can arrest someone who commits a cognizable and non-bailable offence in his presence, like a serious violent crime, and must hand him over to the police immediately (Section 40 BNSS, earlier Section 43 CrPC). Magistrates A Magistrate can himself order and even personally arrest a person committing an offence in his presence (Section 41 BNSS, earlier Section 44 CrPC). On refusal to give name and address If a person is reasonably suspected of an offence and refuses to give his name and residence, police may arrest him to find these details (Section 39 BNSS, earlier Section 42 CrPC). Preventive arrest by police Under Section 170 BNSS (earlier Section 151 CrPC), police can make preventive arrest to stop the commission of a cognizable offence if it cannot be otherwise prevented. 4. When can police arrest without warrant? – Section 35 BNSS / Section 41 CrPC This is the heart of modern arrest law. 4.1 General power Under Section 35 BNSS, any police officer may arrest without a warrant in certain situations – for example, where a person: Commits an offence in the presence of the police officer. Is reasonably suspected of having committed a cognizable offence (serious offences like cheating above certain amounts, hurt, theft, rape, etc.). Is a proclaimed offender or is found with stolen property, etc. 4.2 The “necessity test” – police must justify arrest The Supreme Court has repeatedly said: “Having the power to arrest is one thing, the justification to arrest is another.” Section 35 BNSS (like old Section 41 CrPC) now builds this into the law. Police must consider whether arrest is necessary for reasons such as: To prevent further offences. To stop the accused from tampering with evidence. To prevent the accused from threatening or influencing witnesses. To ensure the accused appears in court. If these reasons do not exist, police are expected not to arrest and instead use notice of appearance (see next part). 4.3 Special protection for elderly and infirm Section 35(7) BNSS provides that no arrest shall be made for certain minor offences (punishable with less than 3 years) where the person is infirm or above 60 years, without prior permission of a senior police officer (not below DSP rank). This is important if you are worried about arrest of elderly parents or sick persons in a family dispute. 5. Notice instead of arrest – the Arnesh Kumar principle Under old CrPC, Section 41A allowed police to issue a notice to appear instead of arrest. Under BNSS, this concept is merged into Section 35 itself.  The Supreme Court, in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, strongly criticised routine arrests, especially in offences like Section 498A IPC, and directed that: Police should first issue a notice asking the accused to join the investigation. Arrest should be made only if the accused does not cooperate or if the necessity test is satisfied. Many High Courts continue to reinforce these directions even under BNSS. If you receive such a notice: Do not ignore it. Immediately contact a lawyer. Cooperate, but do not give self-incriminating detailed statements without legal advice. 6. Arrest with warrant – when does the court issue a warrant? Arrest with warrant is regulated under BNSS “Processes to Compel Appearance” (corresponding to Chapter VI of CrPC). A Magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest when: A complaint or police report (FIR/final report) is before the court. The court takes cognizance of an offence and finds that the presence of the accused is needed. The offence is serious or the accused has not responded to summons/notices. Warrants may be: Bailable – the accused can be released on bail directly by