Author: Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal

Rajasthan HC: Recovery Alone Not Enough in Bribery Case

Rajasthan High Court Acquits Patwari in Bribery Case : Mere Recovery Not Enough Without Proof of Demand (2026 Judgment) In a significant judgment dated 19 March 2026, the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) acquitted a Patwari who had earlier been convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court clearly held that mere recovery of money is not enough to prove a bribery offence unless the prosecution is able to establish both demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt. The case, Mohan Lal Gupta vs State of Rajasthan, arose from allegations that the accused Patwari demanded ₹1,000 from the complainant for entering certain land records. Based on the complaint, the Anti-Corruption Bureau arranged a trap and claimed to have recovered the bribe amount from the accused. The trial court relied on this recovery and convicted the accused under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, awarding imprisonment and fine. However, before the High Court, the accused strongly challenged the conviction. It was argued that he was not responsible for the work related to the complainant’s land and that the relevant work had already been completed earlier. The defence also pointed out that the complainant did not fully support the prosecution’s version, and there were multiple contradictions in the statements of witnesses. It was further contended that the alleged recovery of money was not properly linked to any illegal demand or acceptance. While examining the case, the High Court focused on the core legal requirement in corruption cases — proof of demand and acceptance of bribe. The Court reiterated that demand of illegal gratification is the foundation of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Without clear and reliable evidence of demand, a conviction cannot be sustained. The Court also emphasized that even if money is recovered from the accused, it must be shown that the accused knowingly accepted it as a bribe. Relying on settled law laid down by the Supreme Court, the High Court held that mere recovery of currency notes does not automatically establish guilt. The prosecution must prove a complete chain of events, starting from demand, followed by acceptance, and then recovery. If the initial demand itself is doubtful or not proved, the entire case collapses. In this case, the Court found serious deficiencies in the prosecution’s evidence. There was no clear and convincing proof that the accused had demanded any bribe. The complainant’s testimony did not fully support the prosecution, and independent evidence was lacking. Additionally, there were inconsistencies in witness statements and doubts regarding the recovery process. The Court also noted that the work for which the bribe was allegedly demanded had already been completed, which further weakened the prosecution’s case. Considering all these factors, the High Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the benefit of doubt was given to the accused, and the conviction passed by the trial court was set aside. The accused was accordingly acquitted of all charges. This judgment is highly important from a legal perspective as it reinforces a fundamental principle of criminal law — that no person can be convicted without strict proof of guilt. In corruption cases, courts require clear evidence of demand and acceptance of bribe, and mere recovery of money is not sufficient. The decision also highlights the importance of independent and reliable evidence, especially in trap cases conducted by anti-corruption agencies. In conclusion, the Rajasthan High Court has once again clarified that in bribery cases, “no demand means no conviction.” This ruling will serve as a strong precedent for similar cases and will be particularly useful for defence in corruption matters where the prosecution relies solely on recovery without proving the basic ingredients of the offence. Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur

JDA vs Sai Darshan Hotels (2026): Rajasthan HC Upholds 15% Developed Land in Lieu of Compensation

JDA vs Sai Darshan Hotels (2026): Rajasthan HC Upholds 15% Developed Land in Lieu of Compensation The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 658/2010 decided a significant dispute concerning land acquisition compensation and the right to allotment of developed land in lieu of such compensation. The case arose from acquisition proceedings initiated in 1969 for land situated in Village Chainpura, Sanganer, Jaipur, culminating in an award dated 09.04.1981 granting monetary compensation to the original khatedars. Although the amount was determined and even deposited, it was never actually paid to the landowners, and possession of the land was taken over by the Jaipur Development Authority (JDA) in 1983. Over the years, multiple challenges to the acquisition proceedings were made by the original khatedars and subsequent stakeholders, all of which were dismissed up to the level of the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the respondent company, having acquired rights from earlier landholders, applied to the State Government in 2003 seeking allotment of 15% developed land in lieu of compensation under the prevailing State policy. This policy, particularly the circular dated 13.12.2001 (as amended in 2002), permitted such allotment subject to surrender of rights and withdrawal of litigation. Acting upon this, the respondent withdrew all pending cases, including proceedings before the Supreme Court, and complied with the conditions stipulated by the State. Pursuant to the policy, the State Government issued orders dated 12.05.2003 and 19.05.2003 directing allotment of Plot No. 7 admeasuring 9000 square meters at Airport Plaza, Jaipur, to the respondent. However, these orders were subsequently kept in abeyance by an order dated 23.06.2009, which led to the filing of a writ petition. The learned Single Judge allowed the petition and quashed the abeyance order, holding that the State was bound by the principle of promissory estoppel since the respondent had already acted upon the assurance by withdrawing litigation. In appeal, the JDA contended that the respondent had no valid claim to such allotment, alleging irregularities and asserting that the land had already been acquired and possession taken, leaving no scope for further benefits. It was also argued that the allotment caused financial loss to JDA and was based on improper actions by State authorities. However, the Division Bench, after examining the entire record and affidavits, found that neither the original compensation nor the enhanced compensation awarded by the Reference Court in 1990 had been paid or properly deposited. The Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal to reiterate that mere deposit of compensation does not amount to payment, and therefore, the right to compensation survives. The Court further held that the respondent, as an assignee of the original khatedars, was entitled to claim compensation in accordance with the State policy. Since the respondent had fulfilled all conditions, including withdrawal of litigation, the State Government was bound to honour its promise. The action of keeping the allotment order in abeyance was found to be arbitrary, amounting to giving with one hand and taking away with the other, which is impermissible in law. The Court also observed that the policy providing 15% developed land had already been upheld by the Supreme Court and was binding on the authorities, including JDA. Rejecting the objections raised by JDA, the Court held that the allotment orders had attained finality and could not be questioned on vague allegations. It was further clarified that earlier proceedings did not attract the doctrine of merger or res judicata, as observed by the Supreme Court, and therefore the matter could be examined independently on merits. Ultimately, the Division Bench found no illegality in the order of the learned Single Judge and upheld the respondent’s entitlement to 15% developed land. Accordingly, the Special Appeal filed by JDA was dismissed, and the Court directed JDA to implement the State Government’s orders dated 12.05.2003 and 19.05.2003 by allotting Plot No. 7 admeasuring 9000 square meters at Airport Plaza, Jaipur, to the respondent. The judgment reinforces the principles that non-payment of compensation preserves the right of landowners, that government policies must be implemented fairly, and that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies when a party has altered its position based on governmental assurances.   Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur

Rajasthan High Court Upholds Acquittal in Murder Case Due to Contradictory Circumstantial Evidence and Unexplained FIR Delay

Rajasthan High Court Upholds Acquittal in Murder Case Due to Contradictory Circumstantial Evidence and Unexplained FIR Delay State of Rajasthan v. Sampat & Anr., D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 363/2002, decided on 25 February 2026 (Raj HC, Jaipur Bench), reported in 2026:RJ-JP:8788-DB, per Mahendar Kumar Goyal & Sameer Jain, JJ. (Connected with: Kalyan Ram v. Sampat Singh & Anr., D.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 674/2001) The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 363/2002 and connected Criminal Revision Petition No. 674/2001, delivered its judgment on 25.02.2026, dismissing both the appeal filed by the State and the revision petition filed by the complainant. The case arose from Sessions Case No. 23/1999 decided by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kishangarh, District Ajmer, wherein the accused persons were acquitted of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution case was based on a written report dated 05.03.1999 submitted by Kalyan Ram, on the basis of which FIR No. 31/1999 was registered at Police Station Rupangarh, District Ajmer, for offences under Sections 302 and 34 IPC. It was alleged that the accused had committed the murder of Rupa Ram. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed and charges were framed. However, after trial, the learned trial court acquitted the accused, leading to the present appeal and revision before the High Court. Before the High Court, the State and the complainant argued that the trial court had failed to properly appreciate the circumstantial evidence and that the chain of circumstances clearly established the guilt of the accused. It was submitted that the postmortem report showed an ante-mortem head injury and that a lathi was recovered on the disclosure statement of one of the accused. It was also contended that the delay in lodging the FIR was not fatal to the prosecution case. On the other hand, the counsel for the accused supported the acquittal and argued that the prosecution evidence was contradictory and unreliable. The High Court carefully examined the evidence on record and noted that the case was entirely based on circumstantial evidence. It found material contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, particularly regarding what the deceased allegedly told them about the incident and who was responsible. The Court also observed that although the family members claimed to have known about the incident on the same night, the FIR was lodged after a delay of two days by a person who was neither a close family member nor a resident of the same village. No satisfactory explanation for this delay was provided. Further, the medical evidence did not fully support the prosecution version, as only a swelling on the skull was found and there were inconsistencies regarding the alleged dragging of the deceased. Importantly, the medical evidence suggested the possibility that the deceased might have suffered the fatal injury due to a fall, especially as there was evidence indicating consumption of alcohol. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the fatal injury was caused by the accused. In view of these findings, the High Court concluded that the trial court’s judgment of acquittal did not suffer from any perversity, illegality, or infirmity warranting interference in appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly, both the criminal appeal and the revision petition were dismissed, and the acquittal of the accused was upheld.   By Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

Rajasthan HC Rejects Sentence Suspension in POCSO Appeal Case

Rajasthan HC Rejects Sentence Suspension in POCSO Appeal Case Date of Order: 13.02.2026   The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, recently dealt with a significant suspension of sentence application filed by an accused convicted under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. The case arose from D.B. Criminal Misc. Suspension of Sentence Application No. 2047/2024, filed along with a criminal appeal by the accused Vishnu @ Vikram, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment by the Special Court, POCSO Act, Dausa. The conviction was primarily under Sections 5(l)(m)/6 of the POCSO Act, along with alternative provisions of the Indian Penal Code, for serious allegations involving a minor victim.  The applicant approached the High Court seeking suspension of sentence during the pendency of the appeal. The defence argued that the trial court had wrongly treated the victim as being below eleven years of age without sufficient evidence, and further contended that the allegations of rape were not medically corroborated. It was also submitted that there existed prior enmity between the parties, which allegedly resulted in false implication. On these grounds, the counsel requested the Court to grant relief and suspend the sentence until the appeal was decided.  The State strongly opposed the plea, emphasizing the seriousness of the offence and the material evidence available on record. Upon hearing both sides, the Division Bench carefully examined the trial court judgment dated 20.03.2024. The Court noted that the victim’s age had been determined based on the birth certificate (Exhibit P-16), which showed that she was below eleven years at the time of the offence. Further, the victim’s testimony as PW-2 contained specific allegations of repeated sexual assault. Importantly, forensic evidence played a crucial role, as the DNA profile obtained from semen found on the victim’s clothing matched with the DNA sample of the accused, strengthening the prosecution’s case.  Considering the gravity of the accusations, the age of the victim, and the supporting forensic material, the High Court held that this was not a fit case for granting suspension of sentence. The Bench observed that the nature of evidence and seriousness of the offence weighed against the applicant. Consequently, the application for suspension of sentence was dismissed, and the accused was directed to continue serving the sentence awarded by the trial court.  This order highlights the cautious approach adopted by courts in cases involving offences against children, especially where strong testimonial and scientific evidence is available. It reiterates that suspension of sentence in serious POCSO convictions is not granted as a matter of routine and depends heavily on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and the overall circumstances of the case.

Rajasthan High Court Allows Re-Medical Examination in Police Telecommunication Operator Recruitment Due to Weight Discrepancy

Rajasthan High Court Allows Re-Medical Examination in Police Telecommunication Operator Recruitment Due to Weight Discrepancy The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1612/2026, dealt with an important issue concerning recruitment eligibility and medical assessment in the police telecommunication operator recruitment process. The petitioner, Anushka Sonwal, had applied for the post of Constable Police Telecommunication Operator under the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989, pursuant to an advertisement dated 09.04.2025. She claimed that she had secured a suitable position in the merit list and belonged to the SC Female category, fulfilling all required qualifications for the post. However, during the Physical Measurement Test, she was declared ineligible on the ground that her recorded weight was 43.30 kg, which was below the prescribed minimum requirement of 47.5 kg.  The petitioner challenged the disqualification by producing a health certificate issued shortly after the rejection by a Medical Officer from a Government Hospital at Jhalana Doongri, Jaipur, which certified her weight as 48 kg. The petitioner argued that there was a clear discrepancy between the weight measurements taken by two different authorities, and therefore she sought an opportunity for re-medical examination by an independent medical board. The counsel submitted that a fresh assessment by experts at AIIMS would help resolve the factual dispute regarding her eligibility. While considering the matter, the High Court observed that writ jurisdiction is generally not invoked in cases involving disputed questions of fact, particularly those related to physical measurements or medical fitness. Nevertheless, the Court took note of the special circumstances of the case, namely that a government medical officer had issued a certificate indicating that the petitioner met the prescribed weight requirement within a short span of time after she was declared ineligible. Taking a balanced approach, the Court granted liberty to the petitioner to undergo a fresh medical examination by a Medical Board to be constituted by AIIMS, Jodhpur. The order directed that the petitioner must submit an application within seven days along with a demand draft of Rs. 10,000 in favour of the Superintendent of AIIMS, Jodhpur, following which the medical board would assess her weight within a stipulated period. The Court further clarified that if the AIIMS medical experts certify that the petitioner’s weight is 48 kg or more, she would be entitled to submit a representation before the concerned recruitment authorities, who must then consider her case strictly in accordance with law. Importantly, the Court emphasized that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the recruitment dispute and had only provided a procedural remedy to resolve the factual inconsistency. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of with these directions, leaving the final decision to the competent authorities based on the outcome of the medical examination.

Section 17-B Industrial Disputes Act: Rajasthan High Court Clarifies Workman Entitlement to Last Drawn Wages, Not Minimum Wages During Pendency

Section 17-B Industrial Disputes Act: Rajasthan High Court Clarifies Workman Entitlement to Last Drawn Wages, Not Minimum Wages During Pendency The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur, in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 113/2025, delivered an important ruling clarifying the scope of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the entitlement of a workman to wages during the pendency of litigation. The case arose from a dispute involving the University of Rajasthan and a workman, where the primary issue was whether a workman is entitled to minimum wages or only the last drawn wages while the employer’s challenge to a Labour Court award is pending before the High Court. The Court examined earlier precedents and statutory provisions to determine the correct interpretation of the law.  The Bench observed that the controversy was no longer res integra because earlier Division Bench decisions had already settled that during the pendency of proceedings, the workman is entitled to wages based on the last drawn salary rather than revised pay scales or enhanced minimum wages. The Court relied on prior judgments, including cases relating to Gram Panchayat Manoharpura and other authorities, which held that the purpose of Section 17-B is to provide subsistence support to the workman so that he does not suffer financial hardship while defending litigation. This payment acts as a safeguard against starvation but does not create a right to increased or revised wages.  While the respondent argued that minimum wages fixed by the State should be treated as maintenance allowance, the Court rejected this interpretation. Referring to judicial precedents, the Bench clarified that Section 17-B grants a statutory right to receive “full wages last drawn,” and although constitutional courts may in exceptional circumstances grant a higher amount in the interest of justice, such directions remain outside the strict framework of Section 17-B. Therefore, equating minimum wages with maintenance allowance was found to be inconsistent with the statutory scheme.  A significant aspect of the judgment was the Court’s interpretation of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The Bench held that minimum wages apply only to persons who are actually employed and working in an industry. A workman whose termination is under challenge and who is not presently in service cannot claim minimum wages merely because litigation is pending. Instead, during this period of non-employment, the legal mechanism available is subsistence allowance under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. This distinction was crucial in setting aside the Single Judge’s direction that required payment of minimum wages during the pendency of the writ petition.  Consequently, the Division Bench partly allowed the appeal and modified the earlier order. It ruled that the employer must continue to pay the workman the full wages last drawn, along with any admissible maintenance allowance, until the main petition is finally decided. However, payment of revised minimum wages or increments during this period was held to be beyond the scope of Section 17-B. The Court also requested expeditious disposal of the pending petition before the Single Judge to ensure timely resolution of the dispute.  Overall, the judgment reinforces a consistent judicial approach that Section 17-B is a protective provision intended to sustain a workman during litigation but not to enhance his financial entitlement beyond the last drawn wages. By distinguishing between subsistence allowance and minimum wages, the Rajasthan High Court clarified the limits of judicial discretion and ensured that the statutory framework of the Industrial Disputes Act is interpreted strictly while still balancing the interests of both employers and employees.   Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

Claim of Maintenance by a Divorced Wife

Claim of maintenance by a divorced wife A divorced wife has a statutory right to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Every divorced wife, if otherwise eligible and unable to maintain herself, is entitled to the benefit of maintenance allowance. Divorce by itself does not extinguish the right of maintenance, and the obligation of the husband continues unless specifically discharged in accordance with law. Where the husband fails to prove that he was actually paying maintenance to the divorced wife, and merely contends that she forfeited her right due to divorce or an earlier consent decree, the essential condition of “neglect or refusal to maintain” stands satisfied. In such circumstances, a divorced wife is not required to plead or prove that she was not living separately by mutual consent. This principle has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli (1979 Cr LJ 151 SC) and reaffirmed by the Kerala High Court in Kamalakshi v. Sankaran (AIR 1979 Ker 116). Under Section 127(3)(b) of the CrPC, a husband can seek absolution from his obligation under Section 125 towards a divorced wife only on proof that he has paid a sum in accordance with customary or personal law, and that such sum is reasonably sufficient to substitute the maintenance allowance. Mere assertion of divorce or settlement is not enough. This legal position was authoritatively settled in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli (1979 Cr LJ 151 SC) and followed in Kamalakshi v. Sankaran (AIR 1979 Ker 116). The right of a divorced wife to receive maintenance flows directly from her status as a divorced wife. This right does not depend upon any further condition once divorce is established and inability to maintain herself is shown, as held in M. Nanu v. Vasantha (1986 Cr LJ 652). After divorce, the husband cannot insist that the wife should live with him, and consequently, the divorced wife is under no obligation to prove sufficient cause for living separately. This principle has been upheld in Velukutti v. Prasanna Kumar (1985 Cr LJ 1558 Ker) and Hari Singh v. Gulab Devi II (1989) DMC 439 (Raj). Even where the marriage has been dissolved by mutual consent, the divorced wife, if unable to maintain herself, is entitled to claim maintenance until she remarries. This position was clearly recognized in Sadasivam Pillai v. Vijaya Lakshmi (1989 Cr LJ 765). It is now a well-settled proposition of law that even where there is a valid decree of divorce, the wife remains entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. A decree of divorce cannot be used as a ground to deny maintenance, as held in Chandrakant v. Sulochana (1997 Cr LJ 520 Bom). Further, even when a decree of divorce is passed against the wife on the ground of desertion, she is not barred from claiming maintenance against her former husband from the date of the decree. This legal position has been affirmed in Jashelal v. Pushpabati (1998 Cr LJ 4740) and Harish v. Kabita Bai (2007 Cr LJ (NOC) 724 MP). Similarly, where a decree for restitution of conjugal rights had been passed prior to divorce, such decree loses all relevance once the marriage stands dissolved. After divorce, the earlier decree for restitution of conjugal rights ceases to have any legal significance, and the divorced wife cannot be denied maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. This principle was upheld in Koli Gomiben Shyamji v. Koli Laxman Premji (1998 Cr LJ 429 Guj). The Supreme Court has categorically held that a woman, after divorce, is entitled to claim maintenance from her former husband if she is unable to maintain herself and so long as she does not remarry. The ex-husband continues to remain under a statutory duty and legal obligation to provide maintenance to his divorced wife. This authoritative declaration of law is found in Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri (AIR 2000 SC 952). The fact that at the time of an initial compromise the wife did not claim maintenance, or that she did not seek maintenance at the disposal of the matrimonial suit, does not bar her from claiming maintenance at a subsequent stage. Any agreement or understanding whereby a wife relinquishes her right to future maintenance has no legal sanction, being opposed to public policy. This position has been reiterated in Bishnupriya Bhuniya v. Jhumi Banik (AIR 2007 NOC 657 Gau). By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

Alimony in Hindu Marriage Act & Section 141 BNSS Maintenance

Alimony under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (Now Section 141 BNSS) Even where alimony pendente lite is granted by the civil court in matrimonial proceeding under s. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act in favour of the wife alone, the Magistrate under s. 125, CrPC/141 BNSS can grant higher maintenance for wife and children (Ramesh Chandra v Veena Kaushal 1979 Cr LJ 3 (SC)).  However, the quantum of maintenance awarded under s. 125, CrPC /141 BNSS is adjustable with the award of alimony pendente lite granted by the Matrimonial Court (Sudip Chaudhary v Radha Chowdhury 1999 Cr LJ 466 (SC). When the plea of adjustment was not raised then the maintenance ordered under s. 125, CrPC/141 BNSS and alimony pendente lite ordered under s. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act are payable to the wife and both the orders are required to be complied with till the final decision is rendered by the civil court. After the civil court passes the final order of alimony, the husband can apply for cancellation or variation of the order passed under s. 125, CrPC/141 BNSS (T.Rajinder Singh v Maya Devi 1996 Cr LJ 2384 (AP). Only because a proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 is pending, an application under s. 125, CrPC/141 BNSS cannot be dismissed summarily (Balan v Pankojakhy 1992 Ker LJ 778). Even refusal of granting pendente lite maintenance by the civil court is not binding on the criminal court and the Magistrate can grant maintenance under s. 125, CrPC/141 BNSS in spite of such refusal (Ashok Nath Singh v Upasama Panwar 1994 Cr LJ 998 (H.P).  In case of dismissal of husband’s petition under any one of the ss. 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, alimony under the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be granted. But the wife can maintain a petition under s. 125, CrPC (Now 141 BNSS) – Chand Dhawan v Jawaharlal Dhawan (1993)3 SCC 406; 1993 Cr LJ 2930 Petition for nullity of marriage pending Even if a petition for nullity of marriage is pending under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, this will be no ground for refusal of maintenance to the wife under s. 125, CrPC, but in such petition for nullity of marriage, no interim direction has been given Manoj v M. Sindhi 2007 Cr LJ (NOC) 2 (Ker). Civil Court’s decree is binding on Criminal Court The question arose that if the husband obtained a decree for divorce on the ground of desertion by the wife, the petition under s. 125, CrPC cannot be dismissed summarily. The Magistrate has to scrutinize the judgment of the civil court to ascertain as to whether there was really any finding recorded by the civil court or not that the wife was guilty of desertion. However, the civil court decree is binding on the criminal court (Jasholal Agarwal v Pushupati 1994 Cr LJ 185 (Ori). Decree for restitution of conjugal rights However, despite the decree for restitution of conjugal rights passed against the wife, the wife may file an application under s. 125, CrPC unless it is proved that the person, in whose favour the decree was passed, was willing to discharge the obligation as a husband and has not secured the decree in order to frustrate the order of maintenance under s. 125, CrPC (K. NArayan Rao v Bhagyalakshmi 1984 Cr LJ 276 (Kant); Mr Shakal v Shahina Parveen (1987)1 Crima 115 (Del). When, in spite of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the wife refused to stay with the husband and the husband obtained a decree for divorce on the ground of desertion, the wife is not entitled to apply for maintenance under s. 125, CrPC (In the matter of Rabindra Nath Ray 1995 Cr LJ 1187 (Cal.) By Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court

Rajasthan High Court Holds That Short Absence Is Not Desertion: CRPF Constable Reinstated

Rajasthan High Court Holds That Short Absence Is Not Desertion: CRPF Constable Reinstated The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, has delivered an important judgment clarifying the legal distinction between desertion and unauthorised absence in disciplined forces. In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7778/2006, the Court set aside the removal of a CRPF constable who had been wrongly treated as a deserter for a short period of absence. The judgment reaffirms that temporary absence, followed by voluntary rejoining of duty, does not amount to desertion under the CRPF Act, 1949  The petitioner was appointed as a Constable (GD) in the Central Reserve Police Force in 1995 and had a strong service record. During his tenure, he was repeatedly appreciated for his performance, including sensitive deployments during post-riot duties in Gujarat and rescue and relief operations during the Bhuj earthquake. Despite this, a charge-sheet was issued against him in 2002 alleging desertion from training, unauthorised stay outside the camp, misconduct during training, and habitual indiscipline. Based on these allegations, the disciplinary authority imposed the extreme penalty of removal from service, which was later upheld in appeal and revision. The core issue before the High Court was whether the petitioner’s absence for about twenty days, which was supported by medical evidence and followed by voluntary resumption of duty, could legally be treated as desertion. The Court examined the scheme of the CRPF Act, 1949, particularly Sections 9 and 10, and observed that the law makes a clear distinction between desertion and absence without leave. Desertion is classified as a more heinous offence and requires animus deserendi, meaning a deliberate and permanent intention to abandon service. Absence without leave, on the other hand, is a lesser offence and does not automatically become desertion. The Court noted that the charge-sheet itself admitted that the petitioner rejoined duty on his own within a short period. This admitted fact completely negated any intention to permanently abandon service. The Court held that once voluntary rejoining is established, the essential ingredient of desertion is missing, rendering the charge legally unsustainable. Branding such a short absence as desertion was held to be a clear case of non-application of mind. The High Court also found serious procedural lapses in the departmental enquiry. Despite repeated requests, the petitioner was not supplied with relied-upon documents, and he was denied an effective opportunity to examine defence witnesses. The Enquiry Officer ignored unimpeachable medical records showing that the petitioner was suffering from acute renal pain and had undergone hospital treatment during the relevant period. The illness of his wife was also supported by documentary evidence, yet these mitigating circumstances were brushed aside without reasons. Further, the allegation that the petitioner stayed outside the camp without permission was found to be completely false, as the respondents’ own records showed that written permission had been granted to him earlier. The charge relating to misconduct during training was also unsupported by evidence, as training records reflected good conduct and high performance. The Court observed that earlier minor punishments could not be used to label the petitioner as habitually indisciplined so as to justify removal from service. The High Court strongly criticised the appellate and revisional authorities for passing cryptic and non-speaking orders. It held that statutory remedies lose their purpose if authorities fail to apply independent mind and merely endorse earlier decisions mechanically. The punishment of removal from service was held to be shockingly disproportionate, especially when imposed on a constable with a proven record of dedication and gallantry, and where the alleged misconduct arose largely from medical exigencies. Ultimately, the Rajasthan High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the removal order along with all consequential appellate and revisional orders. The respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and seniority. However, the Court limited the relief to notional benefits and denied actual back wages for the intervening period. The entire exercise was directed to be completed within sixty days from receipt of the judgment. This judgment is significant for service jurisprudence in uniformed forces. It reinforces that every unauthorised absence is not desertion, that intention to permanently abandon service is the decisive factor, and that disciplinary authorities must strictly follow statutory safeguards. The ruling serves as a reminder that while discipline is vital, it cannot be enforced at the cost of fairness, proportionality, and the rule of law. Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal

JVVNL Forcing Plot Owners to buy electricity from builder is illegal : Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench

JVVNL Forcing Plot Owners to buy electricity from builder is illegal : Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench Janak Singh Hada Vs State of Rajasthan & Others and Connected Matters D.B. Civil Writ Petition Number 7445/2025 Date of Judgment : 07.01.2026 In a significant judgment protecting the rights of homeowners, the Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has granted relief to plot owners of Vatika Infotech City who were denied individual electricity connections for years. The case arose from a long-standing dispute where residents of a JDA-approved colony were forced to purchase electricity from private developer-linked companies instead of receiving direct domestic electricity connections from Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (JVVNL). The High Court’s order dated 07 January 2026 has clarified the legal position on single point electricity connections, private monopoly, and the statutory duty of distribution companies. Vatika Infotech City is a large residential township in Jaipur with more than 3,500 plots approved by the Jaipur Development Authority. Despite residents owning freehold plots and having constructed houses on their own land, JVVNL consistently refused to provide individual electricity connections. Instead, residents were compelled to buy electricity through sub-meters installed by private companies associated with the builder, which were operating without any licence under the Electricity Act, 2003. This practice continued for more than fifteen years, causing serious hardship to residents. Aggrieved plot owners, including Janak Singh Hada and other similarly placed residents, approached the Rajasthan High Court by filing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petition challenged Regulation 6.3 of the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Electricity Supply Code and Connected Matters) Regulations, 2021, alleging that it was being misused to justify an illegal monopoly of electricity distribution by non-licensee private companies. The petitioners also challenged the refusal letter dated 17.11.2023 by JVVNL, which directed residents to obtain electricity from the developer instead of granting direct connections. The petitioners argued that under Section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003, every distribution licensee has a statutory duty to supply electricity to an owner or occupier of premises upon application. They further contended that Regulation 6.3 itself contains a proviso that clearly protects the right of an individual consumer to demand direct electricity supply from the distribution licensee. Despite this, JVVNL continued to deny connections, citing reasons such as “single point connection” and “non-electrification of the colony,” while simultaneously allowing private companies to sell electricity within the same colony. After examining the pleadings, documents, and the connected writ petitions, the Rajasthan High Court made crucial observations. The Court held that JVVNL, being a distribution licensee under the Electricity Act, cannot shift its statutory responsibility onto a private developer. The Court found that Regulation 6.3 does not prohibit individual electricity connections and, in fact, mandates release of direct connections when demanded by eligible applicants. The practice of forcing residents to buy electricity from a builder through a single point connection was held to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and contrary to law. The High Court further recognised that electricity is an essential service and forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Denial of electricity to residents who have complied with all requirements and are willing to pay applicable charges was found to be a clear violation of constitutional and statutory rights. The Court rejected the argument that the colony was not electrified, observing that such a stand was neither fair nor justified when electricity was already being supplied through private intermediaries. By its final order, the Rajasthan High Court directed Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited to issue independent electricity connections to the petitioners after completion of necessary formalities and payment of applicable charges. The Court ordered that such connections must be released within a period of two months from the date of the order. While the challenge to the constitutional validity of Regulation 6.3 was kept open for consideration in an appropriate case, the Court granted substantial relief to the residents by enforcing their right to direct electricity supply. This judgment is extremely important for plot owners and residents living in private colonies across Rajasthan. It sends a clear message that developers cannot run parallel electricity distribution systems without a licence and that distribution companies cannot abdicate their statutory duties. The decision also curbs the practice of creating illegal monopolies over essential services like electricity and strengthens consumer rights in urban residential colonies. In conclusion, the Rajasthan High Court’s decision in the Vatika Infotech City electricity case reaffirms that electricity is not a privilege controlled by builders but a legal right guaranteed under law. Distribution licensees are bound to serve consumers directly, and regulatory provisions cannot be misused to deny citizens access to basic necessities. This judgment will serve as a strong precedent for similar disputes involving denial of electricity connections in developer-led townships across the state. Counsel for the Petitioners Bhuvnesh Kumar GoyalAdvocate in Jaipur High Court